

DFID's Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Programming in Sudan



Independent
Commission
for Aid Impact

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	Green: The programme performs well overall against ICAI's criteria for effectiveness and value for money. Some improvements are needed.
	Green-Amber: The programme performs relatively well overall against ICAI's criteria for effectiveness and value for money. Improvements should be made.
	Amber-Red: The programme performs relatively poorly overall against ICAI's criteria for effectiveness and value for money. Significant improvements should be made.
	Red: The programme performs poorly overall against ICAI's criteria for effectiveness and value for money. Immediate and major changes need to be made.

Executive Summary

DFID's response to the Darfur conflict since 2003 was one of its largest ever humanitarian operations. In the absence of a clear political agreement, the humanitarian support has continued, even though many displaced people have now settled permanently in new locations. This evaluation looks at the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) component of DFID's response. It examines the relative effectiveness of three delivery channels and DFID's ability to adjust from emergency to more sustainable support in a protracted conflict.

Overall *Assessment: Amber-Red* 

Following mass displacement in Darfur, DFID helped to save lives by providing essential WASH services to the affected population. As the crisis became chronic, however, continued emergency support has created dependency. DFID has been the largest contributor to a United Nations Common Humanitarian Fund (UN-CHF), with £36 million in WASH support. While the UN-CHF helped to strengthen UN leadership of the emergency response, it has failed to adapt to a changing strategic context. With its £6.7 million Darfur Urban Water Supply (DUWS) project delivered by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), DFID attempted to shift to more sustainable investments in water security. The initiative was, however, poorly designed with insufficient attention to institutional and economic realities. DFID's direct partnership with the non-governmental organisation Tearfund (£2.8 million in WASH support) has proved more responsive and beneficiary-focussed. On its own, it would merit a Green rating.¹ Overall, we find that DFID needs to rethink its approach to engaging in chronic emergencies.

Objectives *Assessment: Amber-Red* 

The UN-CHF helped to strengthen UN leadership of the humanitarian effort but its objectives have failed to adapt to changing beneficiary needs. DFID's partnership with Tearfund proved more flexible and beneficiary-focussed. Its later DUWS investment in water infrastructure appropriately attempted to address the environmental consequences of mass displacement but was hampered by poor design.

Delivery *Assessment: Amber-Red* 

DFID's choice of delivery channels was appropriate in the context of a large-scale emergency response but proved less effective as the conflict became protracted. The UN-CHF has been cumbersome in operation, with high management costs and a tendency to over-deliver simple outputs rather than tailor its support to beneficiary needs.

By contrast, Tearfund has developed strong delivery arrangements with good beneficiary engagement. UNOPS has provided technically proficient delivery of the DUWS project, with good procurement and oversight of contractors.

Impact *Assessment: Green-Amber* 

The rating here is a fine balance. While impact data are scarce, DFID's early WASH interventions helped to save lives by contributing to a reduction in the incidence of water-borne disease. Tearfund's community engagement approach offers a real prospect of sustainable impact. By contrast, as the situation has developed, annual emergency support through the UN-CHF is not providing sustainable solutions. The DUWS project has generated little or no impact for the intended beneficiaries.

Learning *Assessment: Green-Amber* 

DFID has invested in learning and innovation around the design of humanitarian funding instruments. It has been less engaged with strategy development for the UN humanitarian system, which has showed little capacity for learning in response to a changing environment. DFID has engaged in research and policy advocacy on environmental and urbanisation issues but with limited policy impact in a difficult political environment. We are concerned that lessons are yet to be learned from the DUWS project on water markets and institutions.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: DFID should produce a detailed strategy and results framework for transition away from emergency WASH humanitarian programming in Darfur towards more sustainable investments in infrastructure and services.

Recommendation 2: DFID funding through the Sudan UN-CHF should be phased out in favour of multi-annual grants direct to delivery partners for sustainable interventions.

Recommendation 3: DFID should ensure that lessons from the DUWS project are integrated into its business cases for future water programmes in Sudan and elsewhere.

Recommendation 4: At the corporate level, DFID should ensure that its WASH policy framework prioritises early planning for transition from emergency assistance through early recovery to development programming in the context of protracted and chronic crises.

¹ See Figure A1 in the Annex for a summary of scoring by project.

1 Introduction

1.1 This evaluation assesses the effectiveness and value for money of the Department for International Development's (DFID's) support for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programming in Sudan.² WASH has been an integral part of DFID's humanitarian response to the Darfur conflict since 2003. This evaluation, therefore, enables us to assess how well DFID manages the transition from short-term emergency assistance towards more sustainable support in protracted humanitarian crises.

The chronic emergency in Darfur

Conflict in Darfur

1.2 Sudan has experienced almost continuous civil war since 1955. In 2011, South Sudan seceded after a lengthy armed struggle but there is continued conflict in the border areas. The Darfur region, on Sudan's western border (see Figure 1), has been in a state of chronic emergency since large-scale armed violence broke out in 2003. The intensive phase of the conflict resulted in a reported 300,000 deaths, mainly from malnutrition and disease, while displacing 2.7 million people from their homes.³

1.3 Analysts have linked the conflict to the long-term political and economic marginalisation of the Darfur region, with its diversity of tribal and ethnic groups.⁴ The Government of Sudan and its local proxies responded to localised rebellions with large-scale violence and human rights abuses, leading to the indictment of the Sudanese president and several other senior government officials for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.⁵

1.4 The level of violence in Darfur has now reduced significantly from its peak in the period after 2003 but, despite continuing international support for the peace process, there has been no clear resolution

of the conflict. While mortality and internal displacement rates are lower, there are periodic increases.⁶ Localised conflict continues among a range of groups, however, including Government of Sudan forces, local militia, excluded political groups, different ethnic and tribal communities, pastoralists and farmers, unemployed youth and internally displaced people (IDPs). These struggles are increasingly over control of land and other natural resources.

Figure 1: Map of Sudan



Humanitarian and development challenges

1.5 Sudan's economy has been hit hard by the loss of oil revenues since the secession of South Sudan.⁷ Food insecurity has increased as a result of austerity measures. With annual inflation reaching more than 40% in 2012,⁸ the price of basic foodstuffs has spiralled. Child malnutrition rates are at emergency levels. More than 10% of children will die before the age of five, many from water-borne or sanitation-related diseases such as diarrhoea, malaria and typhoid.⁹

² South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 following a protracted conflict. In this report, we examine DFID's programming in the former Sudan from 2006 to August 2011 and in Sudan (i.e. not including South Sudan) since August 2011. We note, however, that the majority of DFID's humanitarian WASH programming throughout the period of the review has been in the Darfur region, which remains in Sudan.

³ Degomme, O. and Guha-Spaul, D., *Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur*, Lancet, volume 375, 2010, pages 294-300.

⁴ Flint, J. and De Waal, A., *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*, Zed Books, 2005.

⁵ For details of the charges, see the International Criminal Court website: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN/Menu/ICC/Situations%20and%20Cases/Situations/Situation%20ICC%200205/Pages/situation%20icc-0205.aspx>.

⁶ For details of current mortality rates, see *Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012*, United Nations, 2012, http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan_Humanitarian%20Work%20Plan_2012.pdf.

⁷ *Operational Plan 2011-2015*, DFID Sudan, May 2012, page 2, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/documents/publications1/op/sudan-2011.pdf>.

⁸ *Sudan 2012 Article IV Consultation*, International Monetary Fund, November 2012, page 8, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12298.pdf>.

⁹ *Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012*, United Nations, 2012, page 32, http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan_Humanitarian%20Work%20Plan_2012.pdf.

1 Introduction

- 1.6 In Darfur, drought and floods, in part caused by changing weather patterns in an already arid region, have affected people intermittently since the 1970s. Adverse weather has contributed to poverty rates (69% in north Darfur) that are among the highest in Sudan.¹⁰ Some 3.1 million people – approximately half of the population – receive food aid and 1.9 million remain displaced.¹¹
- 1.7 At the height of the conflict, providing emergency WASH services to the IDP population was one of the most urgent humanitarian priorities. The combination of temporary settlements, unsafe water supplies and poor hygiene practices left IDPs highly vulnerable to epidemics. During the peak of the humanitarian crisis, diarrhoeal diseases were among the main causes of mortality and morbidity.¹² Over time, however, the nature of the challenge has changed. Many of the IDPs have settled into permanent communities on the fringes of Darfur's urban centres. Most of these communities now have access to WASH. The challenge is to provide them with water security in an affordable and environmentally sustainable way. There are, in addition, IDPs in rural areas that still lack basic WASH services, although their need is increasingly shared with the rural population as a whole.
- 1.8 With conflict continuing, Darfur presents a very difficult environment in which to deliver humanitarian aid. Humanitarian operations remain vulnerable to the kidnapping of aid workers, hijacking of vehicles and looting of relief convoys. The United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was established to provide security for humanitarian operations and has 22,000 troops. International agencies, nonetheless, have limited access to Darfur.
- 1.9 The humanitarian response also faces substantial political obstacles. International sanctions against Sudan prevent any direct financial support to the Government of Sudan, so DFID support goes through other channels, principally UN agencies

and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The UN reported that the Government of Sudan restricted humanitarian access to populations in need on more than 50 occasions in 2008.¹³ Access has continued to be a problem. DFID and other international partners are required to obtain permits to travel to or operate in Darfur, which is often a source of delay. In 2009, the Government of Sudan expelled 13 major international NGOs from Darfur, including four of DFID's implementing partners.

UK aid to Sudan

- 1.10 Humanitarian support to Sudan was scaled up rapidly in response to the 2003 Darfur crisis. By 2005, Sudan was the largest recipient of humanitarian assistance in the world, receiving £780 million¹⁴ – or 12% of global humanitarian aid from government donors.¹⁵ Darfur was a key part of this response, receiving 29% (£228 million) of funding allocated under the UN Humanitarian Work Plan. It hosted 16,000 humanitarian personnel working for more than 105 UN agencies and NGOs.
- 1.11 DFID's support to Sudan has been predominantly humanitarian. During the 1990s, it provided small-scale support through Operation Lifeline Sudan via its Nairobi office. Its humanitarian assistance expanded rapidly from 2004, peaking at £97.8 million in 2005-06, making the UK the third-largest donor after the United States and the European Union. It developed its first Country Engagement Plan in 2005¹⁶ and established a country office in Khartoum in 2006. Humanitarian support to Sudan fell in 2008-09 as the Darfur conflict declined in intensity, only to scale up again as DFID increased its support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan (see Figure 2 on page 4).

¹³ Sudan: NGO Expulsions Fact Sheet #04, reliefweb, April 2009, <http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-ngo-expulsions-fact-sheet-04-fy-2009>.

¹⁴ Sudan emergencies for 2005, OCHA Financial Tracking Service, 2005, http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R10c_C200_Y2005_asof_1211170230.pdf.

¹⁵ Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2011, Development Initiatives, 2011, page 12, <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/gha-report-2011.pdf>.

¹⁶ Sudan Country Engagement Plan, DFID, January 2005, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/sudan-country-engagement-plan0105.pdf>.

¹⁰ Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012, United Nations, 2012, page 32, http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan_Humanitarian%20Work%20Plan_2012.pdf.


¹¹ Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012, United Nations, 2012, page 3, http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan_Humanitarian%20Work%20Plan_2012.pdf.

¹² Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Links to Health: Facts and Figures, World Health Organization (WHO), 2004, http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/factsfigures2005.pdf.

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1.12 In 2011, a separate South Sudan country programme was established, leaving UK support for Sudan for 2011-12 at £30.4 million, of which £6.8 million is humanitarian.¹⁷ Ever since its first Country Engagement Plan in 2005, DFID has expressed the goal of shifting the balance of its expenditure away from humanitarian support towards longer-term development assistance. This transition, however, has proved difficult to accomplish. DFID's Operational Plan for 2011-15 anticipates that humanitarian assistance will represent 45% of total expenditure over that period.¹⁸

Figure 2: DFID's support to Sudan



Source: DFID Annual Reports, 2003 to 2012. Data to 2010-11 is for the former Sudan. Data for 2011-12 relates only to Sudan (i.e. not including South Sudan)

Our review of DFID's WASH programming

1.13 WASH has consistently been among the top four sectors within the international humanitarian response in Darfur, alongside food aid, health and nutrition. Since its 2005 Country Engagement Plan, DFID has also introduced WASH programming designed to address environmental sustainability issues in Darfur. Altogether, it has invested over £50 million in WASH in the period 2006 to 2012.¹⁹

1.14 We chose to examine a sample of DFID's WASH interventions across three different delivery channels: a multi-donor UN-led trust fund; an NGO

accountable grant; and a direct contract with a UN agency (see Figure 3). Our sample covers over 80% of total DFID WASH expenditure over the period 2006-12 (see Figure A2 in the Annex for more details).

Figure 3: Our project sample

Project	Direct partners	Period	DFID funding	WASH component
Common Humanitarian Fund (UN-CHF)	OCHA/UNDP	2006 onwards	£270 million (48% share – seven other donors)	£36 million (13% total)
Integrated Relief and Recovery (IRR)	Tearfund	2007-12	£6.8 million (21% share – ten other donors)	£2.8 million (41% total)
Darfur Urban Water Supply (DUWS)	UNOPS	2011-13	£6.7 million (£5.5 million spent as at 31 January 2013) (sole funder)	£6.7 million (100% total)

1.15 The **Common Humanitarian Fund (UN-CHF)** is a multi-donor trust fund managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA). It provides annual grants to a range of UN agencies and international and national NGOs, for activities under the Sudan Humanitarian Work Plan. DFID was a strong supporter of the establishment of the UN-CHF in 2006 to strengthen UN co-ordination and leadership of the humanitarian response. It has been its largest contributor ever since.

1.16 The **Integrated Relief and Recovery (IRR) project** is a multi-sector emergency and early recovery programme implemented by the international NGO, Tearfund, in collaboration with the Government of Sudan and local community groups. It is focussed on improving the health and well-being of conflict-affected populations through a range of interventions to improve water supply, sanitation and health practices. DFID support has

¹⁷ Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12, DFID, 2012, page 66, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/departmental-report/2012/Annual-report-accounts-2011-12.pdf>.

¹⁸ Operational Plan 2011-2015, DFID Sudan, May 2012, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/sudan-2011.pdf>.

¹⁹ This is an approximate figure, derived by calculating the proportion of multi-sectoral programmes spent on WASH: figures provided by DFID.

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been through a series of annual grant agreements, although with an element of multi-annual planning.

- 1.17 The **Darfur Urban Water Supply (DUWS) project** is managed by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). It aims to increase the sustainable water supply to four towns in Darfur to increase their resilience to drought through a two-year programme of investment. Uniquely among the sample, it is on the borderline between a humanitarian and a development intervention, helping the urban centres deal with the environmental impact of the large IDP influx, many of whom are unlikely to return to their original homes. It consists mainly of investments in water infrastructure implemented by Sudanese contractors.

Our approach

- 1.18 As part of our evaluation, we conducted a literature review of WASH programming in fragile and conflict settings, including WASH services for humanitarian relief, recovery and rehabilitation. We reviewed DFID humanitarian and WASH policy frameworks. We conducted a two-week evaluation mission to Sudan. In Khartoum, we met with DFID, representatives of the Government of Sudan and state governments, other donors, international and national NGOs and contractors. We undertook a field visit to El Fasher in Darfur and met with a range of intended beneficiaries, including women and children in IDP areas and poor urban localities. We also met with a wide range of other stakeholders, including local government officials, water utilities, private companies, water sellers and local NGOs.

2 Findings

Objectives

Assessment: Amber-Red 

2.1 In this section, we examine whether DFID's objectives in the WASH sector are clear and relevant to the Darfur context and whether they adequately address the needs of the intended beneficiaries. We look both at DFID's overall strategy towards the provision of humanitarian assistance in Darfur and at the design of the WASH projects in our sample.

Lack of strategic direction in the UN-CHF

2.2 During its period of large-scale humanitarian operations in Darfur, between 2004 and 2008, DFID's stated goals were very high-level: to save lives, protect civilians and ensure humanitarian access to the 2.7 million people displaced by the conflict.²⁰ WASH was an important component in a multi-sector response that also included food, nutrition and health. It was not until 2011 that DFID introduced a specific WASH target – namely the provision of clean drinking water to 800,000 people by 2015.²¹

2.3 Three quarters of DFID's WASH funding has passed through the UN-CHF (see Figure 4 for details of the support). The UN-CHF was created in 2006 as part of a broader set of reforms to the international humanitarian system, motivated in part by its perceived failures in Darfur.²² They included the introduction of the 'cluster' system of UN co-ordination, a stronger role for UN humanitarian co-ordinators and the development of a series of pooled funding instruments, of which the UN-CHF was one. DFID supported the design of the UN-CHF, provided its initial finance and has remained its largest donor ever since. One of its core objectives for doing so has been to demonstrate continuing support for UN leadership.

2.4 By funding through the UN-CHF, DFID passed responsibility for determining sector-specific objectives to the UN through its annual Humanitarian Work Plans, first prepared in 2005.

These set out delivery goals for WASH, including the provision of 15 litres per person per day of safe drinking water, basic sanitation and safe hygiene practices for all conflict-affected and displaced people.

Figure 4: WASH activities funded through the UN-CHF

The package of WASH activities funded through the UN-CHF has varied each year but has typically included:

- **Water supply:** construction and rehabilitation of boreholes, motorised pumps, hand-dug wells, water tanks, construction of water points, animal water troughs, rainwater harvesting systems, generator fuel, tool kits for maintenance, training of mechanics, monitoring and analysis of water samples and training water user committees;
- **Sanitation:** construction of slab latrines (communal and for households, schools and health centres), building hand-washing facilities, waste-water soak pits (bio-filters) and the training of masons and artisans; and
- **Hygiene promotion:** recruitment and training of hygiene educators and health facilitators, awareness raising for teachers, establishing school hygiene committees, public campaigns and awareness raising, establishing health clubs and committees, distributing hygiene kits and soap, surveys of local knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP surveys) and training on diarrhoea prevention.

2.5 The Government of Sudan has a policy of promoting return to place of origin as the primary solution for displacement in Darfur. It discourages IDPs from taking up permanent residence in the urban areas. Despite international misgivings, the UN Humanitarian Work Plan is aligned to this policy, prioritising humanitarian support for IDPs, returnees and conflict-affected rural populations to promote return.²³ In 2009, a joint UN and Government of Sudan mission identified 15 areas in Darfur where returns should be prioritised. The Government of Sudan also constructed a number of 'model return villages'.

2.6 Despite these measures, only a small proportion of IDPs have chosen to return permanently to their

²⁰ Sudan Country Engagement Plan, DFID, January 2005, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/sudan-country-engagement-plan0105.pdf>.

²¹ Operational Plan 2011-2015, DFID Sudan, January 2011, page 4.

²² Hilary Benn, UK Secretary of State for International Development, *Reform of the International Humanitarian System*, speech delivered at the Overseas Development Institute, 15 December 2004, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/bennaidssystemreform.asp>.

²³ In the early period, support was also provided to the surrounding population to prevent tension between IDPs and neighbouring communities, in accordance with the principles of conflict-sensitive programming.

2 Findings

original homes, which are mostly in economically marginal areas.²⁴ Overall return figures for the 2006-11 period are unreliable but, in 2011, fewer than 5% (70,000) of the remaining 1.9 million registered IDPs returned to their place of origin. Although their land rights are limited, most IDPs have settled into informal but semi-permanent communities on the fringes of Darfur's urban centres. Many of the men return seasonally to their original homes to protect their land and livestock. Women and children, however, remain in the urban settlements where they have access to humanitarian assistance and informal livelihood opportunities.

- 2.7 In this context, the provision of continued large-scale humanitarian support acts as a disincentive for IDPs either to return to their place of origin (where assistance is likely to be less readily available) or to settle permanently in a new location (causing them to lose their IDP status and therefore their humanitarian support). DFID recognises that continuing support has created dependencies and failed to address the long-term development needs generated by this disguised urbanisation.²⁵
- 2.8 The UN has largely failed to respond to this strategic challenge. In the past year, at DFID's urging, it has added the objectives of promoting durable solutions and reducing aid dependence to its Humanitarian Work Plan.²⁶ On paper, the UN has recognised the importance of integrating IDP camps with adjoining urban areas. Its mix of WASH interventions, however, has changed little.
- 2.9 Despite misgivings about the continued appropriateness of the UN-CHF's objectives, DFID has not had a strong engagement at the strategic level. In recent years, its main strategic interest has been in supporting the conclusion and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan. DFID hoped that a resolution to the Darfur conflict would follow from this agreement. This has not proved to be the case. As a consequence, we find

that the largest share of DFID's humanitarian programme in Darfur has remained in strategic limbo for several years.

More flexible and responsive support through Tearfund

- 2.10 The Tearfund project has proved more effective at responding to the changing strategic context, although its scope is much more limited than that of the UN-CHF. Tearfund first began its partnership with DFID in 2007, delivering an integrated relief and early recovery programme in west Darfur with a substantial WASH component. Its objectives were to reduce malnutrition and mortality among children under five through various measures, including improved access to safe water. Its consultations with beneficiaries led it to allocate 40% of its resources to WASH as the best means of achieving those goals. It focussed on newer IDP settlements and rural communities underserved with clean water sources.
- 2.11 Tearfund has also proved better at focussing on sustainable outcomes by building exit strategies into its engagement with IDPs and rural communities. It limits its financial support for the operations and maintenance of new water facilities to six months and enters into handover agreements with community groups and water authorities. Its support is provided in phases, with emergency support terminating once basic needs are met. In this way, it ensures that its staff are focussed on managing the exit process from the outset of the engagement with each community.
- 2.12 Tearfund has also demonstrated an awareness of environmental sustainability issues. It was an early advocate of the need for better water resource management in IDP settlements and urban areas. It has lobbied line ministries to monitor ground water levels, which is now happening to some degree where equipment is available.

DUWS: a timely shift in strategy but a poor design

- 2.13 Since 2007, DFID has sought to address the environmental impact of mass displacement to urban areas, particularly the risk of depleting groundwater resources. It helped the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to establish a Sudan country programme and conduct

²⁴ Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2011, United Nations, 2011, http://www.unsudanig.org/workplan/2011/docs/2011_Sudan_Workplan.pdf.

²⁵ Draft Humanitarian Business Case, DFID Sudan, 2012.

²⁶ Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012, United Nations, 2012, http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan_Humanitarian%20Work%20Plan_2012.pdf.

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a post-conflict environmental assessment.²⁷ It supports a UNEP project, the Sudan Integrated Environment Programme (SIEP), which aims to build Sudan's capacity to manage environmental resources, including water. We did not examine this programme as part of this review.

- 2.14 DFID also funded the DUWS project through UNOPS to develop water infrastructure in four Darfur urban centres (El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina and Zalingei). Whereas humanitarian support under the Humanitarian Work Plan targets IDPs, returnees and rural communities, the DUWS project was designed to provide sustainable water for the urban population as a whole. This was a positive and timely initiative, intended to address the environmental impact of urbanisation and the consequences of long-term humanitarian assistance on the non-IDP urban poor, a needy group not covered under the Humanitarian Work Plans. By investing in the formal water supply system, DFID sought to increase water security and reduce the cost of water to the urban poor.
- 2.15 Though technically sound, the DUWS design neglected the political and institutional challenges involved in improving urban water supply. It was not based on an analysis of the commercial interests involved in the delivery of water. Under the conditions we observed in El Fasher (see Figure 5), increasing the availability of water without addressing the operation of the water market is unlikely to benefit the urban poor. DFID later adjusted the project to incorporate some advisory support to the water corporation, mainly on performance management. In our view, this was not sufficient to address the original design flaws. Had the project been set a more beneficiary-focussed objective, such as lowering the price of water for poor households, it would have been obliged to engage directly with the operation of the urban water market. Without such engagement, we find that the DUWS project had a sound aim but an inadequate design for delivering it.

Figure 5: Political economy of water in El Fasher

Water in El Fasher is under the control of the North Darfur state water corporation. While the tariffs for piped water to households are low, few households in El Fasher are connected to the system and those that are receive water irregularly. Most of the piped water supply goes to commercial enterprises, government agencies and international organisations. Most private citizens purchase their water from private sellers using tanks mounted on motor vehicles or donkey carts. According to research commissioned by DFID, there are 1,200 water vendors in Nyala (a larger town in South Darfur), who make a living by buying water from the state water corporation or private wells and selling it to households. Water can cost up to £25 a month for a family of five and can consume up to half the income of a poor household.²⁸ The water corporation informed us that the sale of water and permits to water sellers is, in turn, an important source of its revenue.

In these circumstances, without significant changes to the operation of the urban water market, the benefits of an increase in the supply of water to the water corporation are unlikely to be passed on to poor households in the form of lower water prices. In the absence of significant investment in the piped network, the water corporation will maximise its revenue by supplying any extra water to institutional customers and to private water sellers.

Delivery

Assessment: Amber-Red 

- 2.16 In this section, we assess whether DFID's choice of delivery partners was appropriate. We assess whether DFID is controlling overhead costs and maximising value for money through the three delivery channels. We also look at how effectively DFID is managing delivery in the difficult environment and whether adequate measures are in place to control fraud and corruption.

A sound initial choice of delivery partners ultimately limited flexibility

- 2.17 Overall, we found that DFID's choice of delivery partners was appropriate at the outset, given the strategic, political and institutional context at the time the projects began.
- 2.18 Its choices were more constrained in Darfur than in any other part of Sudan. International sanctions

²⁷ Synthesis Report: Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UNEP, June 2007, http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sudan_synthesis_E.pdf.

²⁸ Pipelines and donkey carts: A social risk analysis of water availability, access and use in Nyala, South Darfur, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2011, page 2, www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7634.pdf.

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and the nature of the conflict prevented direct partnerships with the Government of Sudan. Very few private or non-governmental Sudanese organisations had the capacity to deliver humanitarian support at scale.

The UN-CHF strengthened UN leadership but did not lead to effective burden-sharing

2.19 As a funding channel, the UN-CHF offered a number of advantages. It helped to strengthen UN co-ordination of a complex humanitarian operation, which was a key DFID objective. A 2011 evaluation found that it had reduced gaps and overlaps in the humanitarian response.²⁹ It gave the UN Humanitarian Coordinator the flexibility to allocate resources between Darfur and South Sudan according to the perceived level of priority. Compared to direct contracting of the implementing partners, it also reduced DFID's management overheads.

2.20 We discuss below some of the shortcomings we observed in the UN-CHF mechanism, including high management overheads and a lack of responsiveness to changing needs. As a funding mechanism, it had extensive teething problems and DFID was required to invest considerable effort into improving its functioning. It was reasonably efficient at co-ordinating the mass delivery of standardised WASH interventions during the emergency but less effective at tailoring its WASH support as the context changed. We nonetheless recognise that DFID support for the UN-CHF was a strategic choice at the time, given its wider goal of reform of the international humanitarian system.


2.21 One of the potential advantages of the UN-CHF as a funding mechanism should be its ability to attract other donors and encourage more effective burden-sharing. In particular, a multi-donor trust fund should be attractive to smaller donors without the capacity to work directly in Sudan.

2.22 We found, however, that it has only been partially successful at leveraging other resources. As the UN-CHF managing agent, OCHA seems to have

invested insufficient effort into outreach to new donors, in particular non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development donors such as the large Arab funds. The 2008 DFID Country Programme Evaluation concluded that the 'CHF has never come close to being a common fund that most donors would use; instead, it has been one more source of funds with few advantages compared to the alternatives'.³⁰

2.23 As a result, DFID has been left providing nearly half the lifetime funding of the UN-CHF (see Figure 6).³¹ While we commend DFID's willingness to support innovation in the international humanitarian system, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that its high-profile commitment to the UN-CHF left it without the flexibility to reallocate funds when circumstances changed.

Figure 6: DFID's share of total UN-CHF funding



Source: data provided by OCHA

Delivering through NGOs such as Tearfund allows for greater responsiveness

2.24 DFID continued with direct support to NGOs in parallel to the UN-CHF, to ensure a balanced portfolio and to spread the risks involved in a difficult operating environment. In 2009, a number of DFID's NGO partners were expelled by the Government of Sudan. DFID responded by scaling up its support to the remaining NGOs, including

²⁹ Cosgrave, John and Goyder, Hugh, *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund – Country Report: Sudan*, OCHA, March 2011, <http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/UN-CHF%20Sudan%20Evaluation%20Report%202010.pdf>.

³⁰ *UN-CHF Submission*, 15 December 2008, quoted in Foster, Mick et al., *Country Programme Evaluation: Sudan*, EV708, DFID, March 2010, page 31, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/country-programme-ev708.pdf>.

³¹ *Business Case for the Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund*, DFID Sudan, 2012.

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Tearfund, to cover the gaps in support left by the expulsions.

- 2.25 Compared to the UN-CHF, the NGO partnerships require more management input from DFID relative to the expenditure but provide much greater capacity to tailor the support to changing needs on the ground. We find that Tearfund has responded much better to the protracted nature of the Darfur conflict than the UN-CHF, minimising dependence and investing in building sustainable capacity in its target communities.

UNOPS demonstrates strong technical capacity but weaker relationship management

- 2.26 DFID's choice, in 2010, of UNOPS to deliver the DUWS project had a clear rationale. UNOPS had demonstrated its capacity to deliver WASH infrastructure projects effectively in South Sudan. Its technical expertise is solid and it has good systems for procuring and overseeing private contractors. Few other international organisations could have taken on large-scale works in the Darfur context.

- 2.27 UNOPS was weaker at dealing with the complex political and institutional environment. We observed that it had been slow to build the working relationships with government agencies required to secure permits for its work and to partner effectively with the responsible water authorities. DFID informs us that it has taken some remedial action to address this, although UNOPS was still facing permit difficulties at the time of our visit.


High overheads associated with longer delivery chains

- 2.28 Figure 8 on page 11 shows the different delivery chains involved in the three projects in our review. The IRR project has the simplest delivery arrangements, with Tearfund acting as both grantee and implementer. For the DUWS project, DFID contracts with UNOPS which in turn engages local contractors to carry out the works.

- 2.29 The UN-CHF is not a project but a multi-donor basket fund managed by UNDP, with OCHA playing a co-ordination role. The UN-CHF funds both UN agencies and NGOs, through separate procedures. In 2011, 58% of its funds went directly

to UN agencies (see Figure 7). In the WASH sector, most of these funds go to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which is the lead agency in this sector. UNICEF then passes a share of its funding to a central government project management unit, known as Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES). WES organises the operations and maintenance of boreholes in most of the IDP settlements, including fuel for generators. From the rest of its funds, UNICEF engages a range of international and local NGOs to provide specific WASH services.

Figure 7: UN-CHF funding allocations 2011




Source: data provided by OCHA

- 2.30 The remaining UN-CHF funds (42% in 2011) are allocated as annual grants to international and local NGOs. Most of the grants are around £120,000 in size. In many cases, they are used as top-up funding for projects also funded from other sources. Only a few Sudanese NGOs meet the organisational requirements to access UN-CHF grants directly. In some cases, however, they are sub-contracted by international NGOs as local delivery partners for UN-CHF-funded projects.
- 2.31 All WASH operations in Sudan carry high administrative costs, due to the difficult operating environment. DFID Sudan has made efforts to understand these. For example, the delivery partners informed us that DFID has asked them to provide evidence to justify their overheads. DFID has also encouraged and supported OCHA to carry out studies on the drivers of costs in the UN-CHF.

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Figure 8: DFID's WASH funding channels



2.32 Of the three projects in our sample, the longer delivery chains in the UN-CHF involve the highest overall transaction costs. UNDP levies a 1% management fee on the global budget and a further 7% for managing the NGO grant allocation process. OCHA's co-ordination role costs approximately another 1.5% (the proportion has grown as total UN-CHF funding has declined). Each NGO recipient is permitted to charge a 7% central overhead before remitting the funds to its country programme. This means that 16.5% of the funds go on organisational overheads and co-ordination costs, before reaching Sudan.

2.33 The NGOs we spoke to regarded the UN-CHF as a costly way of accessing relatively small grants. They are required to go through lengthy application and reporting procedures, as well as participate in numerous WASH cluster technical working group meetings. By contrast, the shorter IRR and DUWS project delivery chains involve higher management costs for DFID but lower transaction costs overall.

2.34 We accept that higher management costs may on occasion provide better value for money, particularly in difficult operating environments. In the case of the UN-CHF, the costs associated with a joint funding mechanism might be justified if there were a commensurate return in terms of improved co-ordination and coherence, significant leverage of funding from other sources or increased effectiveness of the assistance. While there may have been such a return earlier in the life of UN-CHF, this no longer appears to be the case.

2.35 We also note that UN-CHF funds provided via UN agencies such as UNICEF suffer from a lack of transparency. The UN agencies provide annual financial reports to the UNDP-managed Multi-Donor Trust Fund in New York and activity reports to OCHA in Khartoum. These reporting arrangements make it difficult for DFID to assess the value for money of its support through the UN-CHF.

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2.36 The lack of transparency also makes it difficult to assess whether fiduciary risks are being managed appropriately. A significant share of UN-CHF funding to UNICEF is passed to WES for the purchase of fuel for borehole generators and to fund allowances for WES staff monitoring WASH delivery in the field. Both categories of expenditure risk corruption and should be subject to close supervision. The special status of UN agencies among UN-CHF grantees, however, exempts them from independent oversight.

Methods to improve value for money remain underdeveloped

2.37 DFID has recently begun to demand more from its delivery partners in terms of ensuring value for money. On DFID's instigation, OCHA has included a value for money score in its proposal evaluation criteria, covering cost, timeliness and quality. The scoring methodology, however, is subjective and difficult to apply consistently. There has been no attempt to benchmark unit costs within the UN-CHF, even though the funding of multiple partners to deliver similar assistance would seem to offer opportunities to do so.

2.38 UNOPS makes use of unit cost benchmarking in its tender evaluation processes with its contractors. Tearfund also uses unit cost comparisons to inform decisions on WASH procurement.

2.39 Despite some steps in the right direction, we found that partner understanding of how to measure and deliver value for money remains fairly basic. It is limited to short-term economy measures – namely, procuring inputs at the lowest cost – rather than achieving the best value in the delivery of outputs (e.g. average cost of water supply or hygiene promotion services per thousand IDPs) and outcomes for intended beneficiaries.

2.40 This was a particular issue in the UN-CHF, where the value for money scoring methodology appears to equate lower input costs with higher value. This incentivises the delivery of simple outputs over more complex interventions with higher costs, even where these might offer overall better value for money in terms of beneficiary impact.

2.41 We note that DFID undertook some cost-benefit analysis in the design of the IRR and DUWS

projects, enabling it to calculate a social return on investment. It appears, however, that this analysis is undertaken purely to support the case for funding and is not subsequently revisited and verified.

Monitoring of delivery has proved a challenge in some cases

2.42 Darfur is a difficult and risky environment in which to operate. The risks are magnified by restrictions on access for both DFID and its delivery partners, due to security concerns and the need for official travel permits. This limits their ability to monitor whether activities are being properly implemented and intended results achieved.

2.43 In its grant agreements with Tearfund and other NGOs, DFID has recently introduced peer monitoring, whereby NGO partners are engaged to carry out periodic checks on each other's work. This is a positive approach that DFID has trialled successfully in other difficult operating environments, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Somalia.

2.44 DFID also works closely with its NGO partners on risk management. It has regular dialogue with Tearfund on its objectives, plans and operational budgets. It ensures that Tearfund maintains an updated risk register to monitor delivery risks. Each year, its achievements are reviewed to inform subsequent targets and plans, bringing to light difficulties in the operating environment that are impacting on delivery. As a result, Tearfund has a good record of delivering on its planned outputs.

2.45 DFID puts much less effort into the oversight of its UN partners. UNOPS contractors told us that they face many delivery risks and delays, including bureaucratic processes (obtaining construction permits and import licences), unpredictable security regulations, unclear land tenure and restrictions on the transport of fuel. UNOPS has a policy of checking all imported construction materials before they are used. While intended to mitigate fiduciary risk, this can lead to frequent delays in implementation when UNOPS staff are unable to secure permits to access project sites. Operational risks of this kind have not been

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factored sufficiently into UNOPS project planning and risk management processes.

2.46 DFID does not carry out its own monitoring and oversight of UN-CHF implementing agencies, entrusting this to OCHA and UNDP as fund managers. UNDP carries out initial capacity assessments of its NGO partners but these are not repeated in subsequent years. Monitoring depends mainly on quarterly activity reporting by the delivery partner and scrutiny of financial records. Release of funds is linked to the utilisation of inputs, rather than the delivery of outputs. OCHA and UNDP undertake field visits when security conditions allow but these are usually limited to field offices and more accessible IDP areas. There is no independent monitoring of UN agencies receiving UN-CHF funds.

2.47 We saw no examples of the involvement of local communities in the monitoring of UN-CHF projects. While we saw some use of date-stamped photography to validate outputs, these would have been more effective if linked to global positioning system (GPS) co-ordinates. As a result, it appears that the UN-CHF has limited capacity to verify that many of its reported results are in fact being delivered.

Poor planning and resource allocation within the UN-CHF

2.48 The processes for planning and reporting on delivery within the UN-CHF make it difficult to be confident that resources are being targeted effectively. Outputs are reported in very high-level categories that change each year. They are not matched to spending data, making it impossible to determine the unit cost of particular types of output. It is common to find large variances between planned and actual outputs, including both over- and under-supply. The UN-CHF management were not able to offer any satisfactory explanation for this. It appears that priorities and resource allocation change during the planning period without being properly documented.

2.49 UNICEF, in particular, has regularly delivered two or three times more than its planned WASH outputs over the past three years. For example, in

2011, it reported rehabilitation of 106 water systems against a plan of only 35 and dissemination of hygiene promotion messages to 770,000 people against a planned 330,000.³² This suggests that the original target-setting was poor or that priorities shift according to the availability of funds and the ease of implementation. It also suggests little internal analysis of annual reports, to ensure that resources are better targeted in subsequent years.

2.50 This is, in part, due to the limitations of the UN-CHF's annual funding round. Decisions on grants are made in the first quarter of the calendar year on the basis of plans drawn up in the previous year. The funds are released in two payments, with timing dependent upon the flow of donations into UN-CHF. In 2012, the first payment was made in April and the second in July. This gives grantees significantly less than a year to implement their activities. The grantees have an incentive to prioritise support that can be provided rapidly and with a high level of control by the provider. This leads to the over-delivery of simple outputs, rather than more complex interventions that might better address beneficiary needs. In addition, most of the UN-CHF grantees that we spoke to did not have clear plans for building sustainability and exit into their interventions.

2.51 For example, in the sanitation and hygiene areas, UN-CHF grantees have focussed on the construction of latrines and the mass delivery of sanitation messages (e.g. through radio or posters), rather than more complicated interventions that mobilise beneficiary communities to identify and meet their own needs. While this kind of supply-driven assistance is appropriate in an emergency situation, when speed of delivery is paramount, it works against the delivery of more sustainable, beneficiary-focussed solutions. It suggests that, if the goal is to reduce aid dependency, the UN-CHF may not be the appropriate instrument.

³² Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2011, OCHA, 2011, page 19, <http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Sudan%20UN-CHF%202011.pdf>.

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Control of fraud and corruption becomes weaker down the delivery chain

- 2.52 Sudan is a high-risk environment for fraud and corruption. It ranks 173rd of 176 countries in the 2012 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.³³ WASH operations involving the transportation of fuel and construction materials with high market value pose a particularly high risk.
- 2.53 We found that DFID generally has appropriate fiduciary controls in place for its immediate funding partnerships but that controls become progressively weaker down the delivery chain.
- 2.54 DFID imposes regular audit requirements on its direct implementing partners. At the time of our visit, UNOPS was undergoing an audit for its first period of DFID-funded operations. Tearfund has provided regular audits to DFID since 2007.
- 2.55 In the case of UN-CHF, DFID relies on UNDP as managing agent for fiduciary control. UNDP requires all UN-CHF NGO recipients to be audited once during each grant period (in most cases, annually). UNICEF and other UN recipients are not accountable either to UNDP or DFID. They have their own audit requirements but the results are not shared with UN-CHF funders.
- 2.56 We were told by UNDP that cases of fraud and corruption within UN-CHF have been 'negligible'. It does not appear, however, that grantees are required to report on incidents of fraud and there has been no dialogue among UN-CHF grantees on corruption issues. The UN-CHF NGO grantees that we visited all informed us that they had in place anti-fraud policies and whistleblower procedures but that these have not been utilised. In the circumstances, there is a significant risk that fraud is going undetected.
- 2.57 We found Tearfund to be more forthcoming about the extent of the problem. In the past two years, it had identified three cases of fraud among its own staff, including theft of goods from warehouses, falsified payment receipts and ghost contracts. Tearfund reacted quickly to each incident, minimising its losses and preventing their

recurrence. It acknowledged, however, that it is difficult to take effective action against staff implicated in fraud. In order to operate efficiently in Darfur, it recruits staff with good personal contacts with local authorities, who are then unlikely to be prosecuted in the event of misconduct. Its whistleblower procedures have also proved difficult to implement. On one occasion a whistleblower was arrested and jailed by the Sudanese authorities, which may have discouraged other potential whistleblowers. This reinforces our view that standard anti-fraud procedures may not be sufficient in this context.

- 2.58 According to the DUWS project's contractors we interviewed, corruption is endemic and to an extent tolerated as part of the cost of doing business in Sudan. Some noted that implementing projects in Darfur would be far more difficult without making informal payments to expedite the granting of construction permits and other licences. Although its procurement processes are generally good, UNOPS appeared insufficiently aware that its sub-contractors may be incorporating the costs of informal payments into their bid prices, where they would not be visible to UNOPS. To avoid this, it needs to be more active in using its authority as a UN agency to ensure that the necessary permits are issued swiftly without additional payment. DFID should pursue this issue further with UNOPS.

Impact

Assessment: Green-Amber 

- 2.59 This section examines the impact of DFID's WASH programming in Darfur, from the emergency response through to the protracted or chronic phase of the crisis. We look at the results of the various water, sanitation and hygiene interventions. We also assess how institutional capacity and ownership have been developed to ensure the sustainability of the results. We found very mixed results.

Impact of the UN-CHF

A solid contribution during the emergency phase

- 2.60 The UN-CHF is not a standard project (with defined targets against which impact can be measured) but rather an instrument for topping up funding to humanitarian organisations. Since its

³³ See: <http://www.transparency.org/country#SDN>.

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establishment, it has represented around 10% of total funding to the Humanitarian Work Plan. This 10% is spread broadly, such that most humanitarian projects in Darfur have an element of UN-CHF funding.

- 2.61 The UN-CHF has never attempted to build systems to measure its own impact within the wider humanitarian response. Its reporting focusses mainly on financial data. In recent years, at DFID's urging, it has made more effort to encourage its grantees to report on their activities in a standardised way, so that the results can be aggregated. This has enabled it to produce some data on total outputs each year (see Figure 9 for some of the headline results). We note that these are the total outputs from projects with UN-CHF funding, most of which also have other funders.

Figure 9: Selected UN-CHF outputs, 2008-11

Indicator	2008	2009	2010	2011
Water supply				
Beneficiaries with new water supply facilities	340,000	140,000	480,000	120,000
Beneficiaries with rehabilitated water supply	890,000	1,440,000	1,400,000	N/A
WASH committees created/trained	N/A	38	397	234
Sanitation				
Beneficiaries with new latrines	400,000	38,000	72,000	17,000
Beneficiaries with rehabilitated latrines	28,000	5,000	5,000	2,000
Hygiene promotion				
Hygiene promoters trained	N/A	1,364	1,113	531
People reached with hygiene promotion messages	N/A	2,600,000	2,300,000	960,000

Source: UN-CHF Annual Reports, 2008-11

- 2.62 We find that these aggregate output data provide little usable information on impact. The indicators used vary each year and are often ambiguous, making comparison difficult. Beneficiary numbers are based on assumptions (e.g. that each water point serves 500 people), rather than hard data. There is no way of assessing to what extent activities are repeated each year (e.g. rehabilitation of the same water points). There is no regular reporting on what proportion of the intended beneficiaries have been reached with WASH

services or the level of outstanding need. There is no attempt to link the outputs to impact on beneficiaries, for example, by linking hygiene promotion activities to the incidence of water-borne diseases.

- 2.63 We acknowledge DFID's efforts to address this and that UN-CHF reporting improved somewhat from 2011. We are, nonetheless, concerned to find that there are no reliable results data for the largest share of DFID's humanitarian expenditure in Darfur.
- 2.64 There are some overall data, set out in more detail below, showing how WASH outcomes for IDPs improved, particularly during the emergency phase. The UN-CHF accounts for 10% of the humanitarian funding to the Humanitarian Work Plan and delivered a significant number of relevant outputs during this period. Even in the absence of specific UN-CHF results data, therefore, we believe that it is plausible to conclude that the UN-CHF has made a significant contribution to the overall humanitarian results.
- 2.65 In terms of outputs, the UN-CHF's partners helped to put in place essential water and sanitation infrastructure for those displaced by the Darfur conflict. According to a 2006 survey, the proportion of households in Darfur with access to safe water increased by 10% from 2005 to 2006, to 57%. 90% of IDPs living in camps or communities where they represented the majority population had access to safe water – a much higher proportion than for the population at large. These results, however, have fluctuated since as a result of continuing population displacement.³⁴ In 2011, OCHA reported that UN-CHF partners had provided chlorinated water supply to 530,000 people in Sudan (principally through the routine chlorination of bore water). Although precise figures are not available, it appears that access to safe water among the IDP population is now higher than the national average of 68%.³⁵
- 2.66 Nationally, Sudan is performing very poorly on its sanitation targets, with access to improved

³⁴ *United Nations and Partners Work Plan for Sudan*, OCHA, 2008, page 155, http://www.unsudanig.org/workplan/2008/docs/WP08_Document_volume_1.pdf.

³⁵ *Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: 2012 Update*, UNICEF and WHO, 2012, <http://www.unicef.org/media/files/JMPReport2012.pdf>.


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sanitation at only 26% in 2012 (44% in urban areas and a very low 14% in rural areas).³⁶ UN-CHF partners have constructed over 50,000 latrines in the past four years (each is assumed to serve a family of ten). The rate of latrine construction fell away substantially from 2009 and, in some areas, the WASH technical working group agreed to a moratorium on new latrine construction to prevent over-supply. We do not have an overall figure on access to improved sanitation among IDPs but surveys suggest that, in at least some of the IDP settlements, access is more than double the national rate.

2.67 UN-CHF reports suggest that a high proportion of the IDP population has been reached by hygiene promotion campaigns, peaking at 2.6 million people across Sudan in 2009. While the reporting does not break this down by type of promotional activity, it appears that the bulk is mass campaigns such as radio announcements, leaflets and large public meetings. These methods potentially maximise the numbers of beneficiaries reached but without necessarily producing the largest impact. A few of the NGO grantees, such as Tearfund, have used more intensive methods, such as creating community health clubs, conducting hygiene promotion campaigns in schools and training local communities to take on the hygiene promotion role.


2.68 There are no overall data on the impact of hygiene promotion. Some UN-CHF partners measure the results of their hygiene promotion activities through KAP surveys among intended beneficiaries but only for their own reporting purposes. Coverage is limited and the methodologies are not directly comparable. They do, however, suggest some degree of impact. A KAP survey at Beida IDP settlement, for example, found that hygiene promotion had led to a major increase in hand washing between 2004-07, although with the results falling back somewhat from their peak by 2010 (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: KAP survey results, Beida Camp, west Darfur, 2004-10³⁷



2.69 Overall, the evidence suggests that the UN-CHF has contributed to a set of WASH interventions with lifesaving impact. This can be seen through declining levels of water-borne diseases among the IDP population. World Health Organization (WHO) surveillance data between 2006 and 2011 show cases of bloody diarrhoea peaking in 2006, falling rapidly up to 2009 and then beginning to level off (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: Average weekly incidence of bloody diarrhoea in Darfur IDP camps, 2005-11³⁸



³⁶ Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: 2012 Update, UNICEF and WHO, 2012, <http://www.unicef.org/media/files/JMPReport2012.pdf>.

³⁷ Sources: *Water, Sanitation, Health Promotion and Activities Survey. Beida Locality*, Tearfund, 2010 and Elsadiq and McCulloch, *Health Promotion Survey Summary for Beida Locality and Ardomata and Dorti Camps, West Darfur*, August 2007.

³⁸ Data from *Darfur Weekly Morbidity and Mortality Bulletins*, WHO, 2005-11, see: <http://www.who.int/hac/crises/sdn/sitreps/en/index.html>.

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2.70 The full extent of the UN-CHF contribution and the question of whether the UN-CHF has provided a better return on the investment than other funding channels cannot, however, be assessed on the available data.

Diminishing impact from the UN-CHF over time

2.71 As the conflict became frozen and mass displacement developed into urbanisation, the UN-CHF has continued to provide emergency WASH support to a settled IDP population whose access to improved water and sanitation now appears to be at least as good as the surrounding population's. From 2009, an increasing proportion of the financial support provided through the UN-CHF has gone towards the operation and maintenance of existing WASH infrastructure in established IDP settlements. It is arguable that this support has continued to save lives, in that any interruption of clean water supplies might have risked further outbreaks of disease. We take the view, however, that the return on the investment has decreased over time as a result of the UN-CHF's failure to modify its interventions in response to the changed situation.

2.72 Continued humanitarian support is also likely to distort local water markets and institutions. The two urban IDP settlements that we visited (Abu Shouk and Al Salam) had relatively abundant water supplies. Water-user committee members we spoke to told us that IDP-registered households received 15 litres of free water per person per day, which they considered to be more than enough to meet their basic needs. We observed that some IDPs were using excess water from their allowance for house building or livelihood activities. We were told that water from sources in IDP areas was often sold via donkey cart operations to non-IDP neighbourhoods, particularly in the dry season.

2.73 By comparison, the non-IDP urban poor find themselves in a void, served by neither humanitarian assistance nor any significant investment in urban development from the Government of Sudan. Very few are connected to the piped water system and many of the smaller boreholes and water kiosks in non-IDP areas have

fallen into disrepair.³⁹ Most purchase their water from donkey carts, for which they pay as much as half of their monthly income for poor households.⁴⁰

2.74 In these circumstances, the continued provision of free water to IDPs in peri-urban settings looks increasingly inequitable. It constitutes a disincentive for IDPs either to return to their homes (one of the main objectives of the Humanitarian Work Plan) or to integrate fully into the urban community. Because IDP settlements are treated as temporary, the water infrastructure provided is of low quality and little attention is given to cost recovery, which undermines sustainability. The continuing subsidy to IDPs may even be distorting the operation of the water market at the expense of the non-IDP urban poor.

A good emphasis on sustainability by Tearfund

2.75 Tearfund's IRR project has succeeded in delivering its planned outputs. Since 2007, it has provided 94,000 vulnerable people in west Darfur with access to improved water and sanitation, against a target of 76,000. It has delivered hygiene promotion to 22,000 people, as planned. In light of its successful delivery, DFID has extended the project by a year to reach another 90,000 people with improved water and sanitation and another 14,000 people with hygiene promotion. There is no reporting as yet against these expanded targets.

2.76 The IRR project has also given more attention to the sustainability of its results than most of the interventions funded by the UN-CHF. The project was intended from the outset to bridge the emergency and early recovery phases of the humanitarian response. Its interventions are based on detailed beneficiary needs analysis in specific communities, rather than the mass delivery of standard outputs. It also has a high level of beneficiary engagement in its methodology through 'village development committees' and 'water-user groups', together with the training of maintenance staff. Its sanitation activities focussed on boosting community demand for sanitation. This beneficiary

³⁹ DFID's economic appraisal of the DUWS noted that only four of the reported 16 kiosks in El Fasher were functioning in 2010. *Darfur Urban Water Supply Project Document: Annex 6 – Economic Appraisal*, DFID, 2010.

⁴⁰ *Pipelines and donkey carts: A social risk analysis of water availability, access and use in Nyala, South Darfur*, ODI, 2011, page 2, www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7634.pdf.

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engagement appears to be producing more sustainable results. According to Tearfund, its follow-up monitoring suggests that a creditable 75% of water and sanitation facilities are correctly maintained beyond the project life span, although these results need further verification.

- 2.77 In the Beida IDP settlement, the largest community served by the project, access to safe water had reached 85%, compared to a national average of 67%. Household latrine coverage had reached 94%, compared to a national average of just 47%. Water quality has been regularly monitored and adequately maintained. While some of these results pre-date the start of DFID funding for Tearfund, the partnership has certainly helped to sustain them and extend them to new areas.
- 2.78 We have concern about the impact of its hygiene promotion activities, however. KAP surveys in the Beida IDP settlement (see Figure 10 on page 16) suggest that hand-washing rates have in fact declined over the life of the project.
- 2.79 The project also has a strong focus on environmental sustainability. Through its integrated approach, it has built hygienic slaughter yards, introduced waste carts and disposal pits, constructed more than a kilometre of drainage systems and conducted more than 240 neighbourhood clean-up campaigns.
- 2.80 Because of its greater focus on beneficiary engagement and sustainability, we find the IRR project to be a more appropriate set of interventions for a protracted conflict than most of the projects supported by the UN-CHF. Of the six UN-CHF grantees we spoke to, only two had developed clear plans for transition and exit from emergency support. If we were assessing the Tearfund programme alone we would have given it a Green rating for impact (see Figure A1 in the Annex for individual scores).

DUWS has not produced real change for the intended beneficiaries

- 2.81 The DUWS project was designed to address DFID's concerns with the impact of mass urbanisation on urban water supply in a drought-prone context. The project constructed

mechanised boreholes to increase the overall water supply to four urban centres.

- 2.82 Implementation of the DUWS project has been held up, mainly by delays in obtaining permits from the Government of Sudan for import of materials and construction; evidence in our view of insufficient investment by UNOPS in building relations with the national authorities. The project has been given a no-cost extension until April 2013 and appears to be on track to deliver its planned outputs by then.
- 2.83 Delays in the installation of planned water meters prevent us from giving an accurate figure on the increase in water supply resulting from the works to date. In El Fasher, our water engineer confirmed DFID's estimate of a 20% increase in supply, although this is offset by estimated losses of nearly 50% due to the poor condition of the piped network. In 2012, DFID revised its project plan to include measures to reduce water losses.
- 2.84 The project was originally set a target of improving water access for 450,000 people by its completion date of December 2012. This assumed a parallel Government of Sudan investment in extending the piped network to more of the urban population. This investment was not made and the target was reduced to 150,000 people.⁴¹ Achievement of this revised target also appeared to us unlikely. Because most urban households are not connected to the piped network, we observed in El Fasher that the main beneficiaries of any increased water supply were private companies, government institutions and international organisations. The only exception to this is the proposed works in Zalingei, which are not designed to connect to a piped network.
- 2.85 The indirect impact of the works on the target population is also very limited. The project has not engaged sufficiently with the institutional issues that determine the availability and cost of water to the typical household. It does not monitor the performance of the urban water system as a whole – for example, monthly connections and disconnections or household water costs. The

⁴¹ *Darfur Urban Water Supply Project, Quarterly Progress Report No 7*, UNOPS, April-June 2012.

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nature of the water market in Darfur suggests to us that the project is unlikely to have produced any material benefit for the urban poor. In Figure A1 of the Annex, we give DUWS a Red rating for impact.

Learning

Assessment: Green-Amber 

2.86 In this section, we assess DFID's ability to evaluate the impact of its WASH programming, to draw out and share lessons and to ensure that learning feeds back into its strategies and programming choices.

Mixed evidence on learning from monitoring and evaluation

2.87 DFID has put considerable effort into improving the efficiency of the UN-CHF as a funding mechanism, consistent with its global commitment to reform of the international humanitarian system. It has supported several evaluations of the UN-CHF since its inception in 2006. These have focussed mainly on governance arrangements and funding processes. When a 2007 evaluation criticised UN-CHF procedures as time-consuming and cumbersome and its monitoring and quality assurance processes as weak,⁴² DFID seconded several staff to the UN-CHF to boost its management capacity. It also championed NGO concerns about equity, funding a 2008 study that led to improvements in NGO access to funding.⁴³ It helped to introduce standard output indicators to facilitate reporting.

2.88 There has been much less effort put into reviewing strategy or evaluating impact. DFID expressed concern as early as 2008 about the sustainability of WASH approaches under the UN-CHF.⁴⁴ Four years later, monitoring and evaluation in the UN-CHF is still overwhelmingly focussed on reporting on inputs and outputs, rather than sustainable results. Evaluations are treated as one-off events

at project completion, to meet contractual obligations. Interventions are not designed so as to promote evaluability and learning – for example, by trialling different approaches to hygiene promotion in different communities to compare results.

2.89 On the whole, we find capacity for joint learning within the UN-CHF and the UN WASH cluster to be very weak. There seem to be a number of reasons for this. Technical leadership by UNICEF is not strong, although UNICEF describes this as a result of the recent funding downturn. Complex UN-CHF procedures mean that WASH sector meetings are dominated by discussion of bureaucratic issues, rather than strategy or learning. Monitoring arrangements encourage partners to focus on what has been delivered, rather than what has changed for beneficiaries. Finally, the annual funding cycle encourages partners to repeat the same set of activities each year.

2.90 Despite its leading role within the UN-CHF, DFID has not had the capacity within its Sudan team to engage substantively in all of the humanitarian sectors to which its funding contributes. It has instead left this role to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and sector leads. While this was understandable given resource constraints, it suggests that building stronger learning mechanisms needs to be a priority for the future development of the international humanitarian system.

2.91 Within DFID's own projects, there is an absence of real-time monitoring of emerging results. While this is to some extent due to security constraints, we would have expected to see a more active approach. For example, the DUWS project should monitor changes to the urban water systems it supports by tracking revenue flows or water prices. In the sanitation and hygiene field, DFID should compare output measures in different locations to health indicators, to provide a broader picture on impact.

2.92 We saw evidence that DFID had worked with Tearfund to improve its monitoring and evaluation. Over successive years, its indicators and targets show clear improvements although more could be

⁴² Willitts-King, B., Mowjee, T. and Barnham, J., *Evaluation of Common/Pooled Humanitarian Funds in DRC and Sudan*, commissioned by OCHA, December 2007, http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/UN-CHF_evaluation_report.pdf.

⁴³ Cosgrave, John and Goyder, Hugh, *Evaluation of the Common Humanitarian Fund – Country Report: Sudan*, OCHA, March 2011, <http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/UN-CHF%20Sudan%20Evaluation%20Report%202010.pdf>.

⁴⁴ *UN-CHF Submission*, 15 December 2008, quoted in Foster, Mick et al., *Country Programme Evaluation Sudan: EV708*, DFID, March 2010, page 53, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/country-programme-ev708.pdf>.

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done to measure the sustainability of different kinds of WASH intervention.

- 2.93 Many of the NGOs, including Tearfund, conduct KAP surveys to monitor their hygiene promotion campaigns. These surveys, however, are limited in scope and variable in methodology, which hampers comparison. The weakness of the data suggests that the humanitarian agencies are not investing enough in exit planning.

DFID has led on integrating environmental issues into international support for Sudan

- 2.94 DFID plays an important thought leadership role in Sudan, with considerable capacity to influence and shape the humanitarian and development policy debate. It was one of the first donors to raise concerns about environmental degradation in IDP settings. Its support to Tearfund and UNEP was instrumental in developing an evidence base on the depletion of groundwater and the need for investment in drought preparedness.⁴⁵ This in turn led to the development of the DUWS project as a drought mitigation and water security measure.
- 2.95 DFID has helped to pilot environmentally sustainable solutions to WASH delivery. For instance, it worked with Tearfund to pilot the use of stabilised soil blocks for household latrines, to reduce the need for wood-fired bricks.⁴⁶ With DFID support, Tearfund also piloted the use of solar-powered water pumps to reduce over-reliance on diesel, although with limited success.
- 2.96 DFID also encouraged the UN-CHF to make an environmental assessment part of the formal requirements for project proposals. Nonetheless, the UN-CHF's primary emphasis remains on maximising outputs. We saw little evidence that the WASH sector working group was giving sustained attention to issues of environmental sustainability.

Learning on urban integration of IDPs constrained by the lack of policy dialogue

- 2.97 DFID has had less success in learning and advocacy on the more political issue of IDP resettlement. Over the years, DFID has made use of various formal and informal channels to question the Government of Sudan's policy on promoting return as the main solution to displacement but without apparent success.
- 2.98 While designed primarily as a response to the risk of drought, the DUWS project offered an entry point to engage on this issue. It enabled DFID to commission the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to undertake two studies on the politics and economic interests involved in urbanisation and water supply in Darfur.⁴⁷ The resulting evidence helped DFID to convince the UN Humanitarian Coordinator to include urban integration as one of the goals of the 2012 Humanitarian Work Plan.⁴⁸
- 2.99 The project has not, however, led to a frank discussion with the Government of Sudan on the challenges of integrating IDP settlements into urban areas. Furthermore, the two studies came too late to influence the design of the DUWS project itself. DFID is in the process of designing new water programmes in other parts of Sudan. While the designs were not complete at the time of our visit, we were concerned, from the working documents we reviewed, that lessons from the DUWS project had not yet been incorporated, particularly regarding the economic and governance dimensions of water and sanitation provision. Unless there is a concerted effort to learn from past experience, there is a risk that the failures of the DUWS project will be repeated.

⁴⁵ *The Case for Drought Preparedness: Water Resource Management in Humanitarian Programming in Darfur*, UNEP, 2008; *Darfur: Water Supply in a Vulnerable Environment*, Tearfund, 2007, <http://tilz.tearfund.org/webdocs/Tilz/Topics/watsan/darfurwatervulnerability.pdf>.

⁴⁶ Luckson, K., *Use of Stabilised Soil Blocks for latrine construction: Experiences from Darfur, Sudan*, 35th WEDC International Conference, Loughborough, UK, 2011, <http://tilz.tearfund.org/webdocs/Tilz/Topics/DMT/WEDC%20-%20Use%20of%20Stabilised%20Soil%20Blocks%20for%20latrine%20construction%20Darfur.pdf>.

⁴⁷ *Pipelines and donkey carts: A social risk analysis of water availability, access and use in Nyala, South Darfur*, ODI, 2012,

www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7634.pdf; *City Limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan*, ODI, January 2011, <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/6511.pdf>.

⁴⁸ *Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 2012*, United Nations, 2012, http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/Sudan_Humanitarian%20Work%20Plan_2012.pdf.

3 Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

- 3.1 DFID has clearly helped to save lives through its WASH support for Darfur. It helped its partner NGOs to build up the logistical infrastructure needed to deliver a large-scale, complex humanitarian operation in a difficult environment. It invested a great deal of time and resources into the creation of the UN-CHF to strengthen the leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator.
- 3.2 As early as 2008, DFID recognised that the Darfur conflict had become protracted in nature and set itself the goal of moving from short-term emergency support towards early recovery and more sustainable interventions. DFID has not yet progressed very far with this transition. The bulk of its support continues to be short term in nature. There are a number of reasons for this, including the lack of real partnership with the Government of Sudan and the higher strategic priority DFID placed on other aspects of its engagement with Sudan.
- 3.3 DFID's flexibility has also been reduced by its commitment to the UN-CHF as a funding mechanism. While DFID has put considerable effort into improving its operations, it remains a cumbersome instrument with high management costs. Although it played an important co-ordination role during the emergency response period, it has continued to repeat much the same types of support, despite the changing strategic context and beneficiary needs. As a funding mechanism, it creates incentives for the large-scale delivery of simple outputs over more complex, beneficiary-focussed interventions. We were concerned at the lack of mechanisms for beneficiary feedback on the appropriateness of the assistance. Furthermore, within the context of an annual funding cycle, few of the UN-CHF grantees we spoke to were engaged in serious planning for a transition from emergency WASH interventions towards more sustainable support.
- 3.4 By contrast, DFID's direct partnership with NGOs such as Tearfund has resulted in a more flexible approach that better reflects the needs of beneficiaries. We saw signs that DFID's engagement with Tearfund had led to improvements over the years, particularly in results

management. This learning process would be further strengthened with multi-year rather than annual funding arrangements. We noted that, compared to most UN-CHF implementing partners, Tearfund invests more effort into building local community structures and capacities by planning the handover of WASH services and facilities to local partners from the outset of its engagement. Further evidence and learning is needed, however, on how to build sustainability, particularly for hygiene promotion.

- 3.5 The DUWS project was DFID's main attempt to move from humanitarian to development support and address some of the wider environmental consequences of mass displacement and urbanisation. Unfortunately, the project design was not based on an understanding of the urban water market in Darfur and the political and commercial interests involved. Since then, DFID has commissioned a more detailed analysis of these issues. As it develops future water projects in Sudan, we urge it to give careful attention to the economic and governance dimensions to avoid making the same mistakes.
- 3.6 The major lesson we have drawn from this experience is the importance of transition planning in the context of a protracted conflict or chronic humanitarian crisis. In any chronic emergency, DFID and its partners should begin transition planning from a much earlier date. They should identify a cut-off point – say, when 75% of the target community has access to clean water or the rate of epidemic disease has fallen below a certain level. At this point the emergency provision of WASH support should shift towards more sustainable approaches that empower communities, build sustainable institutions and reduce aid dependence.
- 3.7 The Darfur experience suggests that this may involve changing delivery partners and channels. While the UN-CHF was effective at co-ordinating a mass humanitarian response during the early phase, the lack of strategic leadership from the UN made it less so as the conflict entered its protracted phase. We also note that its one-year funding cycle encourages standardised, supply-driven, output-based support, rather than tailored

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interventions. By contrast, direct funding relationships with NGOs, although more demanding of DFID's time, are more likely to be responsive to the changing context.

- 3.8 We note the importance of efforts to build effective local markets for WASH inputs, whether for the construction and maintenance of solar-powered hand pumps, compressed bricks, latrine slabs or even the production of soap. To be sustainable, WASH interventions need to be integrated with livelihood development and stimulate local markets.
- 3.9 To transition effectively, there need to be systems for monitoring when WASH interventions have achieved their primary, lifesaving purpose and can move towards a more sustainable orientation. At present, a lack of reliable data on how WASH interventions link to health outcomes makes it difficult for implementing partners to know when to move on from emergency support. Such milestones should be built into funding agreements and be the focus of joint learning and strategy-setting between the WASH and health sectors.
- 3.10 Given the high level of fiduciary risk we encountered, DFID also needs to become better not just at ensuring value for money but also at mitigating the associated risks of fraud and corruption. Our findings point to the need for a more systematic approach to political economy analysis in both humanitarian and development aspects of WASH.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: DFID should produce a detailed strategy and results framework for transition away from emergency WASH humanitarian programming in Darfur towards more sustainable investments in infrastructure and services.

- 3.11 The strategy and results framework should enable DFID to track progress towards a specific set of milestones indicating when and where the mode of assistance should shift. The strategy should prioritise building sustainable arrangements for local water source management in IDP settings, reducing subsidy levels for sanitation and handing

over hygiene promotion services to local authorities and communities.

- 3.12 These milestones should be agreed with the UN through the WASH sector working group and integrated into UN-CHF funding agreements and DFID's own partnership agreements. Progress towards these transition goals needs to be closely monitored, with clear decision points for when to shift away from short-term or emergency support.
- 3.13 We recommend moving away from latrine construction and hygiene promotion in all but essential emergency settings. OCHA and the WASH sector should develop criteria for determining when the emergency need has passed.
- 3.14 More evidence is needed on effective institutional arrangements for water source management in IDP settings. Such analysis would provide a foundation for joint learning with delivery partners regarding methods for promoting sustainability, including hybrid arrangements involving the private sector.
- 3.15 A more robust results framework will also enable DFID and its partners to track the links between WASH outputs and health outcomes, to mitigate the risks of the recurrence of water-borne epidemics.

Recommendation 2: DFID funding through the Sudan UN-CHF should be phased out in favour of multi-annual grants direct to delivery partners for sustainable interventions.

- 3.16 The case for continued funding through the UN-CHF is now marginal. The instrument should now be restricted to any further emergency interventions that are required. In the absence of any major new emergency, DFID should phase out its support for the UN-CHF in favour of a more effective delivery mechanism such as an NGO challenge fund with lower transaction costs and built-in incentives for learning and innovation. Consortia including national NGOs should be encouraged to apply, in order to develop national capacity.
- 3.17 DFID should ensure that all of its partners are accountable not just for the cost-effective delivery

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of outputs but also for their progress in working towards sustainable solutions and responsible exit. We recommend moving towards multi-annual grant agreements and results-based contracts. Partners should be encouraged to promote community ownership of WASH services and to work with the private sector to create market-based solutions where appropriate.

- 3.18 DFID should explore the feasibility of designing a specific third-party monitoring contract to assess recipient performance and validate progress, particularly in post-transition contexts.

Recommendation 3: DFID should ensure that lessons from the DUWS project are integrated into its business cases for future water programmes in Sudan and elsewhere.

- 3.19 The overarching lesson from the DUWS experience is that large-scale, water-related interventions need to be not only technically sound but also based on a clear understanding of the institutional setting and the operation of the local water market. DFID should ensure that its future designs are underpinned by robust political, economic and institutional analyses and include detailed risk mitigation plans.

- 3.20 It should clearly identify the intended beneficiaries (e.g. the urban poor) and set goals and targets that are meaningful to those beneficiaries (e.g. the cost of water for the poor, rather than the overall capacity of the water system).

- 3.21 If the investments are intended to contribute to wider goals of peacebuilding and state-building, robust methods should be developed for assessing whether they actually do so.

Recommendation 4: At the corporate level, DFID should ensure that its WASH policy framework prioritises early planning for transition from emergency assistance through early recovery to development programming in the context of protracted and chronic crises.

- 3.22 The Darfur experience suggests that DFID lacks an established approach for dealing with protracted humanitarian crises. Having been unable to move from humanitarian into development planning, DFID found itself repeating much the same set of emergency interventions, despite concerns about

diminishing returns and the risks of aid dependence.

- 3.23 We recommend that DFID address this corporately through policies and guidance on transition and responsible exit planning in WASH (or, alternatively, for its humanitarian support as a whole) in protracted crises. This might include guidance on transition strategies and planning and accompanying toolkits and indicators. The emphasis should be on identifying in advance the triggers that indicate when a shift away from short-term emergency assistance is appropriate and building handover and exit into the design of its interventions from an early stage.

Annex

Figure A1: Summary of scoring by project

This table provides a breakdown of our scoring for each project, against our four criteria of objectives, delivery, impact and learning.

	Share of funding in evaluation sample	Objectives	Delivery	Impact	Learning	Overall
UN-CHF (UN-led trust fund)	79%	 <p>The use of a pooled fund to support UN leadership of the humanitarian effort was an appropriate choice given DFID's wider objective of reform to the humanitarian system. The objectives pursued through the UN-CHF WASH programme have not, however, been updated to match the changing strategic context in Darfur.</p>	 <p>The UN-CHF has proved effective at co-ordinating delivery of large volumes of WASH support among a wide range of UN and NGO implementing agencies. Its long delivery chains, however, have proved cumbersome and its annual funding mechanism incentivises the over-delivery of simple outputs rather than more complex, tailored support.</p>	 <p>The UN-CHF has contributed to providing 76% of the targeted population in Darfur with access to WASH services on an annual basis since 2006, with no major outbreak of water-borne disease. It has given less emphasis to sustainable solutions, leading to aid dependency. For this reason, we would score impact in more recent years as Amber-Red.</p>	 <p>DFID, UNDP and OCHA have worked hard to learn lessons regarding UN-CHF funding mechanics. Yet the UN-CHF has proved poor at learning and adaptation at the strategic level.</p>	 <p>A multi-donor trust fund was an appropriate choice in the early stages of the emergency. The one-year funding instrument has proved less suited to meeting changing beneficiary needs as the conflict became protracted.</p>
IRR (Tearfund)	6%	 <p>DFID support to NGOs such as Tearfund enabled it to be more adaptive and responsive to changing beneficiary needs.</p>	 <p>The direct partnership with Tearfund helped DFID to retain a balanced portfolio. Tearfund was able to develop strong delivery arrangements with good beneficiary engagement.</p>	 <p>Tearfund has provided its intended beneficiaries with access to WASH services, while its investments in capacity development in local communities have enabled more sustainable outcomes.</p>	 <p>Tearfund has maintained a clear focus on learning from the outset, both for its own purposes and for communicating more widely.</p>	 <p>Direct NGO partnerships are more demanding of DFID's time relative to the scale of expenditure but are more responsive to the changing context. A good focus on beneficiary engagement has helped to secure sustainable outcomes.</p>

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	Share of funding in evaluation sample	Objectives	Delivery	Impact	Learning	Overall
DUWS (UNOPS)	15%	 <p>DFID showed strategic leadership in moving beyond humanitarian assistance to address environmental challenges in urban areas but the project was hampered by a weak initial design.</p>	 <p>UNOPS offers technically proficient delivery with good procurement and oversight of contracting partners in a difficult operating environment. Slow development of relations with the Government of Sudan have contributed to delays in delivery.</p>	 <p>There has been little or no beneficiary impact as a result of the failure of planned Government of Sudan investments to go ahead and the lack of attention to governance issues and water markets.</p>	 <p>UNOPS has demonstrated a capacity to learn lessons on delivery, including through improved focus on risk management and value for money assessment. It is not clear that DFID has learned its lessons on engaging with the institutional dimensions of water supply.</p>	 <p>DFID demonstrated clear strategic leadership in developing the DUWS project but paid insufficient attention to the institutional and economic dimensions of actually reaching the intended beneficiaries.</p>
Overall	100%					

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Figure A2: DFID WASH projects in Darfur⁴⁹

This table provides some further detail of DFID's WASH programming in Sudan, including the three projects in our sample and three other projects with WASH components that we did not examine.

Name and purpose of project	Implementing partner	Project period	Total DFID contribution	Share of DFID contribution spent on WASH
Included in review sample				
<p>Darfur Urban Water Supply (DUWS)</p> <p>Sole-funded DFID project to improve the availability and reliability of clean water supply to 450,000 people in four main towns of Darfur (El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina and Zalingei) by installing electric powered boreholes, water pipes and water meters to monitor and control water volumes.</p>	UNOPS	2011-13	£6.7 million total budget, of which £5.5 million was spent as at 31 January 2013	£6.7 million
<p>Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (UN-CHF)</p> <p>A multi-donor trust fund intended to improve the effectiveness of the international humanitarian response in Sudan, to ensure that critical humanitarian needs under the Humanitarian Work Plan are met. WASH is one of four main lifesaving sectors (with health and nutrition; food security and livelihoods; and non-food items and shelter). DFID intended to reach 1.5 million people with safe water and sanitation through this channel.</p>	OCHA and UNDP	2006 onwards	£270 million ⁵⁰	Approximately £36 million ⁵¹
<p>Tearfund Integrated Relief and Recovery (IRR)</p> <p>Project to improve the health and well-being of vulnerable households in Darfur by meeting the emergency and early recovery needs of IDPs and rural communities.</p>	Tearfund	2007-12	£6.8 million	£2.8 million
Excluded from review sample				
<p>Sudan Integrated Environment Programme (SIEP)</p> <p>To improve the management and use of natural resources, including through the construction and rehabilitation of dams in Darfur.</p>	UNEP, with support from UNOPS	2009-12	£20 million	£2.8 million
<p>MEDAIR Humanitarian Response in west Darfur and south Kordofan</p> <p>To work alongside communities and line ministries to exit from and hand over the support of access to basic health care services and water and sanitation for conflict-prone and conflict-affected communities in west Darfur.</p>	MEDAIR	2006-10	£9 million	£3.6 million
<p>Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for Sudan (national)</p> <p>Multi-donor trust fund for supporting activities identified through the 2005 Joint Assessment Mission, including the construction of water points with a focus on school facilities.</p>	World Bank	2005-11	£27 million	Approximately £4 million

⁴⁹ Except where otherwise indicated, data in this table were either provided to ICAI by DFID or came from the DFID Project Database. The share spent on WASH is based on projections at design, rather than actual expenditure.

⁵⁰ Figures from UNDP: <http://mpif.undp.org/factsheet/fund/HSD20>. Total DFID contribution to UN-CHF calculated from annual payments from 2006 to 2012 and converted from US\$ to £ using prevailing average exchange rate for each year.

⁵¹ ICAI calculations based on data published by UN-CHF at <http://workplan.unsdanig.org/chf/2006/index.php>; *Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2011*, OCHA, page 20, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full%20Report_762.pdf; *The Common Humanitarian Fund Sudan – CHF Allocations as of 26/12/2012*, UNDP, December 2012, <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Sudan/AllocationTotalOnePage2012122612.pdf>.

Annex

Figure A3: Chronology of DFID engagement in Darfur

This table provides a chronology of key events in DFID's humanitarian support for Darfur.

Year	Event
2005	Country Engagement Plan for Sudan integrates two humanitarian strategies; reflects strategic intention to reduce humanitarian support in favour of development spending, depending on progress with peace and security. Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed. DFID commences support to World Bank MDTF, which includes support for basic water services.
2006	Sudan country office established. Then-International Development Secretary Hilary Benn instrumental in development of UN-CHF as part of UK commitment to the reform of the international humanitarian system, motivated in part by a slow UN response in Darfur. DFID begins funding the MEDAIR project in west Darfur and southern Kordofan with a strong water and sanitation component.
2007	First DFID accountable grants to Tearfund and GOAL for humanitarian projects with WASH components. DFID begins to engage on environmental issues – finances establishment of UNEP office; begins to plan support for more sustainable water infrastructure in Darfur.
2008	Sudan Country Plan emphasises poverty reduction through sustainable peace; creating an enabling environment for transition from relief to recovery to long-term development; and support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement process as the best means of making progress towards peace. It expresses concern about the suitability of pooled funds and multilateral funding for conflict-related programming. Sudan country governance analysis emphasises importance of security and justice programming, decentralised local governance and support for Comprehensive Peace Agreement and African Union/UN-led Darfur peace process as contributors to poverty reduction.
2009	International Criminal Court indictment of Sudanese President; Government of Sudan expels 13 NGOs from Darfur, including four of DFID's nine NGO partners. DFID scales up support to Tearfund, MEDAIR and GOAL to make up the shortfall. DFID commences support for the UNEP's SIEP project. DFID champions inclusion of environmental assessment criteria in UN-CHF and a special allocation for rapid environmental assessment of IDP camps.
2010	DFID starts DUWS project partnership with UNOPS in Darfur. DFID's Sudan Country Programme Evaluation highlights concerns with the sustainability of basic water and sanitation services in Darfur.

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2011	<p>Secession of South Sudan and the creation of two separate DFID country offices for Sudan and South Sudan. Oil impasse between Sudan and South Sudan leads to budget austerity measures and high inflation in Sudan. World Bank MDTF WASH programme completed.</p> <p>DFID Sudan refreshes 2011-15 Operational Plan – envisages a ‘gradual transition from humanitarian programmes to longer-term development’, describes water and sanitation service provision as an entry point for peacebuilding and state-building and adds the headline result of providing safe water for 800,000 people.</p>
2012	<p>New business cases for Humanitarian and Resilience Programme and Water and Sanitation Programme developed. Water and sanitation considered as entry point for peace and state-building in east Sudan. Growing political instability in Sudan, including fuel protests in Darfur.</p>

Abbreviations

DFID	Department for International Development
DUWS	Darfur Urban Water Supply
GPS	Global positioning system
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
IDP	Internally displaced person
IRR	Integrated Relief and Recovery
KAP	Knowledge, attitudes and practice
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
SIEP	Sudan Integrated Environment Programme
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UN-CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WES	Water, Environment and Sanitation
WHO	World Health Organization

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