

Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI)
Evaluation of DFID’s work on electoral support through UNDP
Inception Report

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1 Introduction

- 1.1 The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) is the independent body responsible for scrutinising UK aid. We focus on maximising the effectiveness of the UK aid budget for intended beneficiaries and on delivering value for money for UK taxpayers. We carry out independent reviews of aid programmes and of issues affecting the delivery of UK aid. We publish transparent, impartial and objective reports to provide evidence and clear recommendations to support UK Government decision-making and to strengthen the accountability of the aid programme. Our reports are written to be accessible to a general readership and we use a simple 'traffic light' system to report our judgement on each programme or topic we review.
- 1.2 We have decided to conduct a review of the management of UK electoral assistance through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a major actor in the delivery of electoral assistance internationally and the implementing partner for most of the UK's electoral assistance. In carrying out this review, we have agreed to co-ordinate with UNDP. This will be a collaborative process, rather than a joint evaluation, with the two organisations sharing their research but drawing fully independent conclusions and each publishing its own report. Working collaboratively will reduce the burden on partners while broadening the reach of both evaluations.
- 1.3 This inception report sets out the evaluation questions, methodology and a work plan for the delivery of the evaluation. It is, however, intended that the methodology and work plan be flexible enough to allow for new issues and questions that emerge over the course of the evaluation.

2 Background

- 2.1 One of the goals of UK development assistance is to support strengthening democracy. Although the electoral system is only one of many institutions required to make a functioning democracy, elections are a necessary part of the democratic process. Free and fair elections call for a complex set of rules and organisational capacities, to enable genuine political competition, manage the different processes involved and ensure that voters are able to participate effectively.
- 2.2 Over the period 2004-09, the Department for International Development (DFID) provided election-related support in 25 countries at a total estimated cost of £121 million. This was one part of DFID's wider support to political systems (including parliaments, political parties and accountability) which totalled approximately £234 million over the same period or 8% of the governance portfolio.¹ In the current Spending Review period (2011-15), DFID will support elections in at least 13 countries.²
- 2.3 Most UK electoral assistance has been directed to supporting countries undertaking specific elections. Disbursement tends to be at its largest within the year preceding an election and over the election period itself. Electoral assistance has tended then to significantly diminish or cease until needed for a subsequent election. Experience shows that this pattern of event-driven electoral assistance largely failed to build sustainable capacity within national electoral systems.³ In recent years, a consensus has emerged internationally on the need for an electoral cycle approach – that is, for sustained support throughout the entire electoral cycle, focussing on the development of robust systems and sustainable capacity. In December 2010, DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) adopted the electoral cycle approach

¹ *Governance Portfolio Review Summary*, DFID, July 2011, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/governance-portfolio.pdf>.

² *Business Plan 2011-2015*, DFID, May 2011, www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/DFID-business-plan.pdf.

³ *Draft Principles of Electoral Assistance*, OECD Development Assistance Committee, March 2010 (updated June 2010), <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/17/45881241.pdf>. *Joint Workshop on Effective Electoral Assistance: Participants' Manual*, European Commission, UNDP and International IDEA, June 2009, http://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=201&Itemid=.

in a joint guidance note on electoral assistance.⁴ It remains to be seen how much delivery will change away from a pattern of finance that is more narrowly episodic.

- 2.4 The UK usually chooses to provide the bulk of its electoral assistance with other donors through a common or basket fund. Most of these electoral basket funds are managed by UNDP, whose global mandate as a UN agency helps it to engage in what can be a sensitive political arena. In a few instances, basket funds are managed by other bilateral donors or by non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
- 2.5 In most cases, Electoral Management Bodies (often Electoral Commissions) are the largest beneficiaries of such basket funds. Typically, these organisations require significant assistance as they are not sufficiently resourced domestically and are often orphans within the national administrative structures.⁵ A range of activities is typically funded out of the basket funds, such as compilation of the electoral roll, boundary delimitation, procuring election materials, voter education, providing technical assistance to build capacity where needed, funding domestic observation and the delivery of the process of the election itself, including the collection, tabulation and reporting of votes. UNDP officials and contracted consultants will engage with the Electoral Management Body in these activities. Other areas that may also be funded through UNDP basket funding include strengthening security around elections, supporting the media and enabling international observation.
- 2.6 As part of its electoral assistance funding, the UK usually supports the UN in its political role. The focus of such activity is to ensure compliance with international standards for the conduct of elections and, crucially, respect for election results. The most senior UN official (the UN Resident Co-ordinator) tends also to be the head of the UNDP office, the UNDP Resident Representative. It therefore typically falls to the UNDP Resident Representative to present the views of the international community to leaders in-country and maintain the channels for political dialogue, particularly if finalising the political transition after elections requires international mediation and negotiation. In such cases (for instance, where results have been contested or the elections marred by violence) the UN system will generally be a key mechanism for reaching a solution. The UK will often fund such mediation activities and engage actively with the UN (and specifically UNDP) throughout the process.
- 2.7 The UK also provides a range of smaller-scale electoral assistance through other channels, such as support to local NGOs or international bodies for election observation or voter education campaigns. UK and international organisations, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), are beneficiaries of electoral assistance. On occasion, DFID also finances the work of the EU and Commonwealth Secretariat to undertake election observation missions at country level.

3 Purpose

- 3.1 To assess whether DFID's funding for electoral support through UNDP is being managed so as to be effective and deliver value for money.

4 Relationship to other evaluations and studies

- 4.1 The *Multilateral Aid Review*,⁶ undertaken by DFID in 2010 and published in 2011, underlined that UNDP is and will remain an important partner for DFID. It noted that, in 2008-09 alone, DFID had channelled £264 million of Official Development Assistance (ODA) through UNDP (£55 million in core funding, £86 million via multi-donor trust funds, £98 million in direct support of projects at country level and £25 million via system-wide funds and thematic funds). The

⁴ *How To Note on Electoral Assistance*, DFID and FCO, December 2010,

<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/elections/how-to-on-elect-asst-summ.pdf>.

⁵ Where they are weakly resourced, Electoral Management Bodies may be perceived to have less influence or impact and therefore be subject to less political pressure. External interference in Electoral Management Bodies, however, is dependent upon many factors.

⁶ *Multilateral Aid Review: United Nations Development Programme (including the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery)*, DFID, 2011, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/mar/undp-inc-bcpr.pdf>.

review's key conclusions are set out below. These general findings from the *Multilateral Aid Review* will form an important back-drop to this evaluation.

**Multilateral Aid Review: United Nations Development Programme (including the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery)
February 2011**

- 'UNDP is critical to the delivery and achievement of DFID/HMG development objectives and this is expected to continue'
- 'UNDP has capacity and systems in place but performance at a country level in fragile states needs to be much more consistent'
- 'UNDP cannot to date demonstrate a track record of gender impact, but it has good policies and systems in place and there is a clear upward trajectory on its gender work'
- 'There is inadequate evidence of environmental safeguards and impact measurement'
- 'The proportion of UNDP's resources going to the highest quartile is much lower than other top performing multilaterals – this is largely because the UNDP is spread (albeit thinly) across a number of middle-income countries (including upper middle income countries)'
- 'UNDP can demonstrate some contribution to development, but country delivery is often weak'
- 'UNDP's results framework, HR and prioritisation on areas where it can add most value are all weak and reduce its impact'
- Financial resource management was characterised as 'above average [for the multilaterals in the survey] but some key areas remain weak'
- 'We could not find sufficient evidence that UNDP is driving forward cost control across its programmes and administration'
- 'UNDP has a strong commitment to partnership but its aid effectiveness record is variable and its partnership with the World Bank in fragile states could be more effective'
- 'UNDP has good disclosure practices; it is committed to IATI [International Aid Transparency Initiative] and has good member state representation. Implementation of IATI may take it to strong overall'
- 'The scale of reform required is significant. There is some potential for progress but it is likely to only be incremental.'

4.2 In 2008-09, DFID and FCO commissioned a series of case studies on UK electoral support, covering Bangladesh, Malawi, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Nepal and Pakistan. These were not evaluations and did not explore the technical design or impact of the assistance. Rather, they focussed on the wider political context and the strategic significance of the donor support. The lessons from these case studies were summarised in a paper⁷ by Roger Wilson (former Head of Governance in DFID) and led to the production of a DFID guidance note on *Electoral Assistance and Politics*.⁸ This work provides a useful body of analysis to draw on for this evaluation but was significantly different in its purpose and approach. Its key recommendations are in the following table:

⁷ Roger Wilson & Bhavna Sharma, *Review of UK Electoral Assistance in the context of lessons emerging from best practice in international experience*, commissioned by the Politics and State Team, DFID Policy Division and the Human Rights, Democracy and Governance Group, FCO, December 2008, http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/Review_UKElectoralAssistance_2008.pdf.

⁸ *Electoral Assistance and Politics: Lessons for International Support*, DFID, 2010, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/elect-asst-pol-less-int-supp.pdf>.

‘...we suggest that the UK could improve its support for elections by:

- formally adopting the electoral cycle approach and aligning long-term programming to include all political actors at elections (including political parties)
- setting goals and targets for democratic development that rank with the MDGs so as to ensure that democratic development, of which elections are a vital part, are not given lower priority than other development goals
- deciding on responses to flawed elections not just on the basis of informal assessments of the outcome - whether the recorded vote reflects ‘the will of the people’ - but also on the quality of the whole electoral process
- increasing confidence in the likelihood of predicting violence around elections by using a checklist of indicators for the potential for violence and stolen elections in order to help country offices to assess whether a more thorough conflict analysis is required and preventative action should be promoted; and by reviewing the frameworks of the Strategic Conflict Assessment and Country Governance Analysis to ensure that they address electoral issues adequately
- strengthening DFID’s capability to analyse constitutional design and to advocate for change where appropriate
- creating a focal point for elections, probably outside DFID, to provide expert advice and an institutional memory to offset the lack of continuity in UK staff between elections.’⁹

4.3 Elections tend to be well reported on by DFID and FCO. Consequently, many of the recent elections have resulted in lesson-learning exercises that are available to inform this evaluation. Similarly, as part of its response to the *Multilateral Aid Review*, DFID sought to strengthen its engagement around elections with UNDP, undertaking an informal process of lesson learning among governance advisers and senior staff in DFID.

4.4 A preliminary review of this and other material sees patterns emerging. UNDP is the only practicable provider of large-scale support for elections in most contexts, principally as a result of its international mandate. DFID, therefore, often has little or no choice of partner organisation for delivering electoral assistance. UNDP’s functions are typically:

- financial management of large-scale funding in support of elections, often in partnership with domestic electoral commissions;
- delivering technical assistance to build capacity in-country (among both government and civil society);
- procurement of election materials and equipment;
- co-ordination of external assistance; and
- political engagement with government on the conduct of the elections.

4.5 Initial findings indicate that the last role can dominate, making a focus on delivery often problematic (both between UNDP and its operational partners in government such as Election Commissions and between DFID and UNDP).

4.6 In 2011, UNDP’s Evaluation Office chose to undertake an evaluation of its work in elections. Simultaneously, the UNDP’s Bureau for Development Policy also chose to undertake a review of the organisation’s work on the same topic. We and the UNDP Evaluation Office have agreed, where possible, to co-ordinate our work during the period of our evaluations. This co-ordination seeks to be mutually beneficial, enhancing our understanding of the effectiveness and value for money provided by UNDP to DFID and informing the UNDP Evaluation Office with information gleaned from our work.

4.7 UNDP will undertake both a portfolio review of UNDP’s electoral support since the 1990s and country case studies. The UNDP’s case studies have been chosen to cover a range of country

⁹ Roger Wilson & Bhavna Sharma, *Review of UK Electoral Assistance in the context of lessons emerging from best practice in international experience*, commissioned by the Politics and State Team, DFID Policy Division and the Human Rights, Democracy and Governance Group, FCO, December 2008, http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/Review_UKElectoralAssistance_2008.pdf.

contexts, including immediate post-conflict, conflict/transition and development, as well as different types of electoral assistance (i.e. event-based or electoral cycle approach). Three of the case studies, which will be undertaken in-country, are countries where DFID has provided significant funding; Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Mozambique. Other countries under consideration by UNDP are Bolivia, Chad, Guinea/Conakry, Guyana, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mexico and possibly Yemen (a country to which DFID has provided money for elections).

5 Methodology

5.1 Our evaluation will consider UNDP's management of UK electoral support, including:

- whether the choice of delivery options and partners is delivering effective assistance and good value for money;
- whether DFID is providing effective management and oversight of UNDP's electoral assistance; and
- whether UK electoral support is anchored in a credible political engagement strategy and a broader strategy of support for political system development.

5.2 These topics will be framed using ICAI's standard evaluation framework. Our approach seeks to consider the relationship between DFID and UNDP from the perspective of the delivery of election support in-country, whilst also gathering perspectives from within DFID and UNDP.

5.3 We have agreed that we will engage in a dialogue with the UNDP Evaluation Office to develop approaches and learn lessons from each other's work. We will share findings on all country studies. In particular, we will shadow the UNDP's evaluation of work in Bangladesh and in Afghanistan. Findings, however, will be produced and reported independently by each organisation.

Evaluation Framework

The evaluation framework for this review is set out in the table below. This has as its basis the standard ICAI guiding criteria and evaluation framework, which are focussed on four areas: objectives, delivery, impact and learning. It also incorporates other pertinent questions we want to investigate in this review. The questions which are highlighted in bold, including those from our Terms of Reference (ToR), are those on which we will focus in particular.

Using questions aimed at the case-study level, the evaluation framework focusses on the achievements of DFID's elections-related investments that have been channelled through UNDP. We will collate our case study findings along with cross-cutting information (such as the Governance Advisers review described in more detail in 5.5, element 4 below) to set aggregate traffic light ratings. We will consider in particular whether UK assistance through UNDP is delivering according to the UK's policy on funding elections as part of a broader commitment to democracy; and whether the UK is supporting a holistic approach throughout the entire electoral cycle.

Relevant ICAI Evaluation Framework Questions	Review Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Objectives: what is the programme trying to achieve?			
Does the programme have clear, relevant and realistic objectives that focus on the desired impact? (1.1)	Does the electoral assistance have clear, relevant and realistic objectives? (ToR 7.2.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of clear objectives being set throughout the results chain • Evidence of objectives being specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and time-bound • Evidence of objectives being informed by country context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP project planning and implementation documentation • Project reviews
Is there a clear and convincing plan, with evidence and assumptions, to show how the programme will work? (1.2)	<p>Does the design of the assistance provide for holistic coverage of the entire electoral cycle? (ToR 7.3.3)</p> <p>Is the design technically adequate across all elements of the electoral cycle approach? (ToR 7.3.4)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of a package of planned activities and investments at each stage of electoral cycle • If the UK-funded activities do not fund the entire cycle, evidence of their planned complementarity with other activities working across the cycle • Evidence of design detail for each intervention • Evidence of comprehensive approaches for each intervention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP project planning and implementation documentation • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society

Relevant ICAI Evaluation Framework Questions	Review Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
<p>Does the programme complement the efforts of government and other aid providers and avoid duplication? (1.3)</p>	<p>Does UK and UNDP collaboration on elections complement the efforts of government and other aid providers and avoid duplication?</p> <p>Are there adequate arrangements for political dialogue with the partner government around the elections? (ToR 7.3.6)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of design detail for each intervention • Evidence of approaches that include other partners in design for each intervention • Evidence of protocols for engagement • Evidence of dialogue taking place • Evidence of outcomes of dialogue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP project planning and implementation documentation • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with party officials/politicians • Interviews with officers of parliament • Interviews with civil society • DFID and UNDP partners • Third party reporting
<p>Are the programme's objectives appropriate to the political, economic, social and environmental context? (1.4)</p>	<p>Is it anchored in a credible overall strategy for political development? (Tor 7.2.2)</p> <p>Does it contribute to reducing the level of risk associated with the delivery of the UK operational plan for the country in question? (ToR 7.2.3)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of political analysis being undertaken • Evidence of planning and implementation using political analysis to inform decisions • Evidence of coherent country strategy for governance at all levels (DFID and UNDP) • Evidence of other activities that seek to strengthen democratic deficits (donor-funded or otherwise) • Evidence of interaction between activities supported and wider governance programmes • Evidence of UK risk assessment of overall operational plan • Evidence of linkage of this programme to overall risk (such as conflict assessments, governance assessments) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UK Government and DFID strategic information • DFID and UNDP project planning and implementation documentation • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Other donor interviews and documentation • Interviews with civil society • Risk assessment • UK Government interviews

Relevant ICAI Evaluation Framework Questions	Review Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Delivery: is the delivery chain designed and managed so as to be fit for purpose?			
Is the choice of funding and delivery options appropriate? (2.1)	Is the choice of funding modality and delivery partner appropriate? (ToR 7.3.2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of options appraisal • Evidence of capacity assessment of partners • Evidence from implementation (reporting, achievements) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID/UNDP documentation • Interviews
Does programme design and roll-out take into account the needs of the intended beneficiaries? (2.2)	Are government, civil society, other national stakeholders and voters sufficiently involved in the design, governance, implementation and monitoring of the assistance? (ToR 7.3.5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of consultation • Evidence of participation in design, governance, implementation and monitoring • Evidence of contribution to design, governance, implementation and monitoring • Evidence of satisfaction of civil society in these processes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with government • Interviews with civil society • Third party reporting • Programme reports
Is there good governance at all levels, with sound financial management and adequate steps being taken to avoid corruption? (2.3)	<p>Does the assistance help protect the independence and integrity of the electoral management body? (ToR 7.3.7)</p> <p>How effective is the financial management of the assistance? Are adequate steps being taken to avoid corruption and mismanagement? (ToR 7.3.8)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of lack of political interference • Evidence of lack of fraud • Evidence of public legitimacy • Evidence of financial controls being in place • Evidence of lack of corruption • Evidence of effective oversight 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial reports • Audit reports • Public reporting (media) • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society • DFID and UNDP financial documentation • Interviews with government partners

Relevant ICAI Evaluation Framework Questions	Review Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Are resources being leveraged so as to work best with others and maximise impact? (2.4)	<p>Is the choice of funding modality and delivery partner appropriate? (ToR 7.3.2)</p> <p>Are other government and donor resources leveraged effectively? (ToR 7.3.2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of options available • Evidence from implementation • Evidence from opinion of partners • Evidence of other finance sources • Evidence of active engagement to identify and utilise other funding sources • Evidence of other funding sources being tracked • Evidence of all funds being managed holistically 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP project planning and implementation documentation • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society • DFID and UNDP financial documentation • Government partners
Do managers ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery chain? (2.5)	<p>Is the assistance delivering value for money through economic inputs, efficient delivery of outputs and high quality results?(ToR 7.3.9)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of cost review and management • Evidence of options analysis in procurement • Evidence of appropriate changes to design and delivery to improve cost 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial reporting • Management minutes • Evaluation reviews • Third party assessments
Is there a clear view of costs throughout the delivery chain? (2.6)	<p>Is there an assessment of value for money throughout the delivery chain? (based on ToR 7.3.9)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of cost appraisals assessments • Evidence of financial reporting • Evidence of assessments being provided by all partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial reporting • Project documentation
Are risks to the achievement of the objectives identified and managed effectively? (2.7)	<p>Have the risks to a free and fair election been identified and adequately managed? (ToR 7.3.1)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of risk appraisal at strategic level prior to design • Evidence of each element of delivery having a risk appraisal • Evidence of risk registers throughout the delivery chain 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk appraisals • Risk registers

Relevant ICAI Evaluation Framework Questions	Review Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Is the programme delivering against its agreed objectives? (2.8)	Is the programme delivering against its agreed objectives? (based on ToR 7.3.9)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of election delivery • Evidence of acceptance of results • Evidence of sustainable capacity building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project reports • Third party reporting • Election monitoring • Interviews with partners and civil society
Are appropriate amendments to objectives made to take account of changing circumstances? (2.9)	Are appropriate amendments to objectives made to take account of changing circumstances?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of analysis • Evidence of decision-making • Appropriate changes in delivery taking place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documentation • Management minutes • Evaluation reviews • Third party assessments
Impact: what is the impact on intended beneficiaries?			
Is the programme delivering clear, significant and timely benefits for the intended beneficiaries? (3.1)	Is the programme producing its intended objectives, including improved electoral systems, strengthened electoral management capacity and enhanced participation by citizens? (ToR 7.4.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of sustainable systems strengthening • Evidence of elections taking place according to plans • Evidence of increased participation in elections • Evidence of respect for results 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP assessments • Third party assessments • Political and other reporting
Is the programme working holistically alongside other programmes? (3.2)	Is the programme working holistically alongside other programmes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of joint design • Evidence of joint management with other bilateral donors and multilateral organisations in the delivery of elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documentation • Partner assessments • Third party assessments • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society

Relevant ICAI Evaluation Framework Questions	Review Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Is there a long-term and sustainable impact from the programme? (3.3)	<p>Is there any evidence of wider impact on the consolidation of democracy? (ToR 7.4.2)</p> <p>Have there been any unintended impacts, positive or negative? (ToR 7.4.4)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of operation of parliament • Evidence of international legitimacy • Evidence of lack of politically inspired conflict • Evidence of respect for and operation of democratic processes in public life • Evidence of external support for elections undermining domestic legitimacy • Evidence of external support building capacity wider than intended organisations • Evidence of external assistance hampering implementation of elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP assessments • Third party assessments • Political and other reporting • Interviews with partners, other donors and civil society
Is there an appropriate exit strategy involving effective transfer of ownership of the programme? (3.4)	<p>Is the programme building sustainable national capacity and financing for electoral management? Is there an appropriate exit strategy for external support? (ToR 7.4.3)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of targets to build sustainable capacity • Evidence of achievement of sustainable capacity being in place • Evidence of increasing leadership and capacity from partner government • Evidence of exit strategy for external support in place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project documentation • Partner assessments • Third party assessments • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society
Is there transparency and accountability to intended beneficiaries, donors and UK taxpayers? (3.5)	<p>Is there transparency and accountability of spending, activities and results to the intended beneficiaries, UK taxpayers and other stakeholders? (ToR 7.4.5)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of details of assistance being publicly available in formats that are accessible to stakeholders in the UK, internationally and in-country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publicly available information and reports (online, media, other) • Interviews with civil society • Interviews with other donors • Evaluation and reporting

Relevant ICAI Evaluation Framework Questions	Review Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Learning: what works and what needs improvement?			
Are there appropriate arrangements for monitoring inputs, processes, outputs, results and impact? (4.1)	<p>Are appropriate arrangements in place for monitoring inputs, processes, outputs and results? (ToR 7.5.1)</p> <p>Has the programme been designed so as to facilitate impact measurement and are appropriate impact assessment processes in place? (ToR 7.5.2)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of monitoring systems throughout the value chain • Evidence of schedules for monitoring and reporting • Evidence of reports being compiled and utilised 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP project planning and implementation documentation • UNDP evaluation process • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society
Is there evidence of innovation and use of global best practice? (4.2)	Is there evidence of innovation and use of global best practice?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of lesson-learning incorporated in design and implementation of the programme and constituent projects • Evidence of innovation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP project planning and implementation documentation • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society
Is there anything currently not being done in respect of the programme that should be undertaken? (4.3)	Is there anything currently not being done in respect of the programme that should be undertaken?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison with UK and UNDP guidance on electoral cycle support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP project planning and implementation documentation • Project reviews • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society

Relevant ICAI Evaluation Framework Questions	Review Questions	Criteria for Assessment	Sources of Evidence
Have lessons about the design and delivery of the programme been learned and shared effectively? (4.4)	Have lessons been learnt about the design and delivery of the programme and have these been used to strengthen the programme and generate wider learning? (ToR 7.5.3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of lesson-learning from previous and comparable exercises incorporated in design and implementation of the programme and constituent projects • Evidence of recommendations from annual monitoring incorporated into operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DFID and UNDP evaluations • DFID operational plans • DFID interviews • UNDP interviews • Interviews with other donors • Interviews with civil society

- 5.4 Our evaluation will make use of an analytical approach and methodology that as far as possible complements that used in the UNDP evaluation, while meeting our own requirements.
- 5.5 The evaluation has the following elements. These will be undertaken in parallel.
1. a mapping of DFID-supported electoral assistance 2001-2011;
 2. four country case studies (two involving in-country studies; two desk reviews shadowing UNDP's own evaluation);
 3. a review of data from the UNDP evaluations;
 4. dialogue with DFID internal staff to gather their assessment of UNDP as a provider of electoral assistance; and
 5. a review of DFID-UNDP management arrangements for oversight of elections.

Element 1: Mapping of UK Electoral Assistance

A mapping of UK electoral assistance according to country, expenditure and delivery method/partner, conducted through analysis of information on DFID's management information systems (Aries and Quest) and interviews with DFID staff in London.

This will require:

- a) a query to be run to generate a single spreadsheet with high-level data, by DFID project code; and
- b) a specific investigation of each project code using project data from Quest and/or Aries to identify funds flow, disbursement patterns and the link between expenditure and performance reporting. In particular, we will seek to identify the terms of conditions set out in any Memoranda of Understanding. This will enable information to be provided in detail on who receives funds from DFID for elections, the cycle of disbursement and the nature of the accountability for expenditure (i.e. the terms on which the finance is provided through UNDP).

Element 2: Country Case Studies

Four country case studies (two involving country visits; two desk studies shadowing UNDP's evaluations) of work in countries where UK electoral assistance is provided through a UNDP-managed basket fund, as well as other channels.

For the two country visits to Burundi and Malawi, we will interview representatives from UNDP, DFID, civil society, the election management bodies, other funders and politicians, using semi-structured interviews guided by the evaluation framework. These visits will be undertaken by a two-person team and will take place between 27 November and 8 December 2011. We will use information from DFID and elsewhere to inform these visits.

Burundi (Country Visit)

DFID has supported elections in Burundi at least since 2004. For the last elections, held in 2010, UNDP managed a US\$46 million basket fund. DFID contributed £1 million to it. The presidential and parliamentary elections of July 2010 were accompanied by some violent incidents. This followed allegations of widespread fraud in the May 2010 communal elections. Although international observers considered these to be unfounded,¹⁰ all six opposition candidates dropped out of the presidential election in June 2010, leaving incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza as the sole candidate. Only two major opposition parties participated in the legislative elections in July. The ruling party won over 80% of parliament seats.

¹⁰ *Rapport Final, Elections Communales, Présidentielle, Législatives, Sénatoriales et Collinaires 2010: Mission d'Observation Électorale de l'Union Européenne*, http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/other/final-report-burundi-2010_fr.pdf.

As part of its *Bilateral Aid Review* in 2010-11,¹¹ DFID decided that its bilateral aid programme to Burundi offered poor value for money compared with other, larger country programmes. DFID said that a large scale-up would have been required to show a significant impact and therefore demonstrate better value for money. DFID believed that achieving this in the short term would have been difficult given capacity constraints in-country. For this and other reasons, DFID decided to close down the bilateral programme and to allocate these resources to larger existing programmes, where it was felt that better value for money and effectiveness could be achieved. DFID maintained some financial support through other channels, in particular a specific regional programme focussing on economic integration. The International Development Committee (IDC) recently carried out an inquiry into this decision, concluding that the bilateral aid programme should be reinstated.¹²

Malawi (Country Visit)

DFID has been supporting electoral processes in Malawi since at least 2000. The DFID support to Malawi's 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections began three years prior to the elections in 2007. Support to the electoral process was managed through a contribution to a UNDP-administered basket fund. Following the 2009 elections, DFID in collaboration with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office provided support to civic and voter education activities targeted towards the 2010 local government elections. Malawi has faced allegations of electoral fraud. The 2009 elections were peaceful and well-managed but with elements judged as below international standards, particularly abuse of incumbency. Since the election, governance in Malawi has deteriorated markedly with suppression of demonstrations, intimidation of civil society organisations and new laws empowering the government to restrict political opposition. This led to DFID suspending budget support to Malawi in July 2011. The difficult political environment makes for an interesting case study as to how effectively UNDP and DFID are able to defend the independence of the electoral body.

For the two case studies where we are shadowing the UNDP evaluations (Bangladesh and Afghanistan), we will undertake a high-level assessment of DFID's internal project documentation and lesson learning, as well as a review of open-source third party documentation. UNDP has readily undertaken to share its preliminary and final conclusions with us prior to publication. We have also agreed to engage with the team leaders of each of the UNDP evaluations to exchange information on emerging findings.

Afghanistan (Desk study shadowing UNDP's evaluation)

Undertaking elections in states where active stabilisation is underway, such as Afghanistan, is a significant challenge. DFID's internal documentation notes donor fatigue after the 2004-05 elections, which resulted in missed opportunities to provide sustained support for Afghanistan's electoral bodies. Subsequent to this period, however, new management bodies, the Independent Electoral Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission, were established, becoming a focus for international support and finance. The majority of external funding for both the 2004-05 and 2010-11 elections has been channelled through a UNDP-managed multi-donor trust fund with activities implemented through the associated programme, UNDP Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT).¹³ UNDP's own reporting shows a total expenditure of US\$378 million, provided by 22 bilateral funders, the EU, UNDP and the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF). DFID's reporting shows it contributed £25.77 million (US\$36.96 million) for elections over this period, primarily through this fund. Given the unique circumstances in Afghanistan where the international engagement is governed by a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1917), co-ordination mechanisms for electoral assistance are specified as the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General. As in other contexts, the UK government has also funded work with civil society bodies in Afghanistan, outside the work of UNDP's programme. In Afghanistan, for instance,

¹¹ *Bilateral Aid Review: Technical Report*, DFID, March 2011,

www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/MAR/FINAL_BAR%20TECHNICAL%20REPORT.pdf.

¹² *The Closure of DFID's Bilateral Aid Programme in Burundi*, International Development Committee, 20 October 2011, HC 1134, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/1134/1134vw.pdf>.

¹³ UNDP ELECT project information, http://www.undp.org.af/whoweare/undpinafghanistan/Projects/dcse/prj_elect.htm.

the UK Conflict Pool¹⁴ supported the work of the Asian Network for Free Elections, implemented through the Asia Foundation. This was in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID). UNDP will be concluding its evaluation of Afghanistan by the second week in January 2012.

Bangladesh (Desk study shadowing UNDP's evaluation)

The UK has supported elections in Bangladesh since the country's birth in 1971. Elections during the last decade have been uncertain and associated with violence. In 2006, elections were suspended and delayed for two years after the Caretaker Government stayed beyond its mandated three-month period. The principal constitutional responsibility of the Caretaker Government was to ensure free and fair elections. With the military's backing, the Caretaker Government ran until December 2008 when, after significant investments from the international community, the country held substantially free and fair elections. The bulk of DFID's assistance for the elections was channelled through UNDP which, as well as managing the multi-donor trust fund, also implemented a series of electoral reform programmes including the *Support to the Electoral Process Project* (US\$4.16 million), *Preparation of Electoral Rolls with Photographs* (US\$78.7 million), the *Transparent Ballot Boxes Project* (US\$6.2 million) and construction of *Server Stations for the Electoral Database* at a cost of US\$47.2 million. UNDP's recent country evaluation notes: 'The Support to Electoral Process in Bangladesh Project was ingenious and flexible in responding to emerging needs in a changed political environment. It directly assisted the implementation of an ambitious roadmap of the Election Commission for holding a free and fair election on the basis of a new voter list and new rules within two years. The preoccupation of the project, however, with the election emergency impeded UNDP's support for the institutional development of the Election Training Institute and of the Election Commission and its secretariat.'¹⁵

Element 3: Review of Data from the UNDP evaluation

A review of data and analysis from the UNDP evaluation. UNDP will provide us with raw and emerging findings to inform our deliberations. These will relate to all its country studies. Where appropriate, we will also participate in discussions with the UNDP team around emerging conclusions.

Element 4: A review of DFID internal staff to gather their assessment of UNDP as a provider of electoral assistance

A written survey of the DFID Governance Advisers responsible for managing the last episode of electoral assistance in the highest-spending 25 countries to solicit their views on the strengths and weaknesses of different delivery options and partners. We have agreed with DFID that findings (anonymised and at synthesis level only) from this element of the evaluation will be shared with DFID to assist with its ongoing development of the relationship with UNDP. We have also agreed to share this information, in the same manner, with UNDP.

Element 5: Review of DFID - UNDP oversight of elections

This will include interviews with DFID's United Nations and Commonwealth Department in London and interviews with UNDP management personnel in New York (carried out by staff from KPMG New York).

We will carry out a review of available documentation on lesson learning regarding UK electoral assistance, including individual project reviews and the case studies commissioned by DFID and FCO in 2008.

¹⁴ The Conflict Pool is a funding mechanism for conflict prevention activities, managed jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, DFID and the Ministry of Defence.

¹⁵ *Assessment of Development Results, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution Bangladesh*, UNDP Evaluations Office, March 2011, <http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloadaddocument.html?docid=4843>.

6 Roles and responsibilities

- 6.1 KPMG will provide oversight of this review under the overall leadership of ICAI Project Director. The team will consist of the following members:

Team member	Role
Team leader	Team Leader
Team member 1	Team Member and Lead Writer
Team member 2	Country Case Studies
Team member 3	Funds mapping
Team member 4	DFID Advisers' Survey
Team member 5	UNDP New York

Team leader (Agulhas)

He is a Director of Agulhas Applied Knowledge. He specialises in aid effectiveness, governance and institutional development. He was originally a health service manager in the UK and has worked on health service reform projects throughout Africa and Asia. He is a member of the core management team for ICAI's implementation and led the Bangladesh climate change evaluation. He has particular knowledge of the subcontinent, having in the past been a governance adviser for DFID in Bangladesh in the late 1990s.

Team member 1 (Agulhas)

With over 15 years in policy analysis, he has worked for a variety of clients on a range of high-level policy issues including implementation of the Paris Declaration, aid effectiveness and fragile states. He is an authority in international law and human rights and has written widely on post-conflict reconstruction, state-building and the restitution of property. He has more recently specialised in aid effectiveness and governance processes at all levels, including policy development, programme design and evaluation.

Team member 2 (Agulhas)

She is a consultant with Agulhas Applied Knowledge and a former programme manager in the DFID Somalia team. As a consultant for the past three years, she has undertaken reviews of the aid architecture in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. She is currently working on the assessment of governance reforms in five African states. She is based in Mombasa and has lived and worked in East Africa for most of the last decade. She also undertook the ICAI evaluation of Bangladesh climate change programmes.

Team member 3 (KPMG)

She works in KPMG's Public Sector Audit Department specialising in external audit and internal audit. Her client base is varied, ranging from central government, local government, health services, trade unions and housing associations. She has over five years' professional experience, including the provision of legal representation at an international level and the provision of pro bono services to a range of high-profile not-for-profit organisations. She also took part in ICAI's review of its approach to effectiveness and value for money.

Team member 4 (KPMG)

She is an advisor in KPMG's Management Consulting Public Sector group, focussing on organisational financial management. She has over ten years' experience in auditing and advising public sector and government clients. Her main role will be to analyse UNDP data sources and figures to support the findings of the report.

Team member 5 (KPMG)

She is a senior manager in KPMG's International Development Assistance Services (IDAS) practice and is located in the firm's New York office. She manages KPMG's United Nations Desk and, in this capacity, develops strategic relationships and opportunities within the UN system and provides project management oversight of key engagements. She has ten years of international professional experience working at the intersection of international development, foreign assistance policy and global philanthropy. Her main role will be to conduct the UNDP head office data collection, first person interviews and financial analysis to support the findings of the report.

7 Management and reporting

- 7.1 A first draft report will be produced for review by the Secretariat and Commissioners by the end of the week commencing 23 January 2012, followed by revision and review prior to completion and sign off by the end of February 2012.

8 Expected outputs and timeframe

- 8.1 The following timetable is indicative. The phases are not strictly sequential, so a degree of overlap is possible.

Phase	Timetable
Planning Finalising methodology Drafting and revising Inception Report	By 24 November 2011
Phase 1: General assessment Preparing literature review Analysis of DFID policy documents Consultation with DFID staff Consultation with donor partners Consultation with UK stakeholders	By 15 December 2011
Phase 2: Case studies Case study 1 – Burundi (country visit) Case study 2 – Malawi (country visit) Case Study 3 – Afghanistan (UNDP Shadow) Case study 4 – Bangladesh (UNDP Shadow)	27 November - 1 December 2011 4 – 8 December 2011 By 11 January 2012 (dependent on data from UNDP) By 20 December 2011 (dependent on data from UNDP)
Phase 3: Analysis and write-up Analysis of case study findings Roundtable with Commissioners Draft main report Revised report Presentations	10 January 2012 27 January 2012 By 24 February 2012 <i>As required</i>

9 Risk assessment

Risk	Level of risk	Specific Issues	Mitigation
No impact data available	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to data sources • ICAI report may be seen as lacking evidence or failing to add value 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assemble evidence from a range of sources • Make a holistic judgement as to whether DFID's approach rests on a solid evidence base
Inability to carry out successful, timely collaboration with UNDP	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Methodology dependent on high level of co-operation from UNDP • Both parties' timetables may change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regular contact with UNDP • DFID country offices have indicated their willingness to participate to agreed timescales
Logistics	Medium/High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fuel situation in Malawi means unable to undertake work in country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage knowledgeable nationals for short inputs and to suggest further contacts
Safety and Security	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk of terrorism • Risk to the person 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate within FCO guidance • Use of experienced local guides and drivers

10 How will this ICAI review make a difference?

- 10.1 It is unlikely that support for elections will cease to be a key part of the UK's and DFID's international efforts in the future. Similarly, the role of the United Nations in assisting governments to meet international norms and standards for law and democracy is also unlikely to change fundamentally. DFID and UNDP are, in a sense, tied together in this work for the foreseeable future. This work will provide independent scrutiny for both partners, assisting in the identification of issues for action that should lead to improvements in impact and delivery.
- 10.2 Certainly two (and, depending on definitions, all four) of the case study countries can be classified as fragile states. With the increasing focus of UK interest in fragile states, where by definition democracy has yet to be embedded, this work will also contribute specifically to improving the delivery and impact of UK assistance for elections in difficult environments.
- 10.3 In addition to the specific contribution to each institution's work on elections, this evaluation will provide a contribution to the wider debate on how DFID engages with UNDP. This is a focus of interest for DFID, in the light of the recommendations of its *Multilateral Aid Review*.