Business in Development

Footnotes

¹ DFID’s Private Sector Development Work, ICAI, May 2014, http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ICAI-PSD-report-FINAL.pdf.

² Bilateral Donors’ Statement in Support of Private Sector Partnerships for Development, http://www.enterprise-development.org/page/download?id=1645.

³ See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/economic-growth/private-sector-development_en.

⁴ The UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study on Sustainability, Accenture and UN Global Compact, 2013, http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-UN-Global-Compact-Acn-CEO-Study-Sustainability-2013.pdf.

⁵ World Investment Report 2014, Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf. Figures are for 2012. Development finance comprises remittances, portfolio investment, ODA, FDI and other investment.

⁶ Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa: an acronym used to indicate middle-income countries that have graduated or are graduating from aid dependency.

⁷ World Investment Report 2014, Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan.

⁸ Exploring the Links between International Business and Poverty Reduction: A Case Study of Unilever in Indonesia, J. Clay, Unilever and Oxfam, 2005, https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/csear/app2practice-docs/CSEAR_oxfam-and-unilever.pdf.

⁹ 21 of the 28 countries prioritised by DFID are considered to be fragile states.

¹⁰ Gram Niyojan Kendra, funded by the Ministry of Women and Child Development.

¹¹ ‘Do no harm’ refers to the risk in development of doing harm by creating unintended consequences or inadvertently making matters worse. See M.B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War, 1999.

¹² Formerly known as the Commonwealth Development Corporation. See http://www.cdcgroup.com. As discussed in paragraph 1.24, we had excluded CDC Group from this review because the National Audit Office had intended to review it during 2015, although this review has since been postponed.

¹³ There are various circumstances in which it may be appropriate to draw conclusions at an instrument-wide level that is at a higher level than that of programmes. These include the availability of sufficient information at programme level from which inductive conclusions can be drawn and the existence of sources of insight, including existing evaluative material, at an instrument level.

¹⁴ World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan. UNCTAD.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ DFID’s list of 55 fragile states draws on three different indices: the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment; the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace; and the Uppsala Conflict Database. DFID’s priority countries were determined following the Bilateral Aid Review in 2010.

¹⁷ Policy: Economic growth in developing countries, UK Government, March 2013 (updated March 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/helping-developing-countries-economies-to-grow.

¹⁸ Economic development for shared prosperity and poverty reduction: a strategic framework, DFID, January 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/276859/Econ-development-strategic-framework_.pdf.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Health Position Paper, Delivering Health Results, DFID, July 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227184/Health_Position_Paper_final_formatted_version.pdf.

²¹ Ibid., page 18.

²² Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience: The UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy, DFID, September 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67468/The_20UK_20Government_s_20Humanitarian_20Policy_20-_20September_202011_20-_20Final.pdf.

²³ The engine of development: The private sector and prosperity for poor people, DFID, May 2011, page 4, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67490/Private-sector-approach-paper-May2011.pdf.

²⁴ See also Managing the Official Development Assistance target, NAO, January 2015, paragraph 1.46, page 31, http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Managing-the-official-development-assistance-target.pdf.

²⁵ These figures include contributions to multinational development banks of £38 million and £362 million respectively which we have excluded from our totals in paragraphs 1.2, 1.15 and 1.18 and Figure 3 but which are classed as non-fiscal development capital investment, discussed further in Annex A3.

²⁶ See also Managing the Official Development Assistance Target, NAO, January 2015, page 31, paragraph 1.46, http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Managing-the-official-development-assistance-target.pdf.

²⁷ Assessing the Impact of the Scale-up of DFID’s Support to Fragile States, ICAI, February 2015, http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFID%E2%80%99s-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf; The UK’s International Climate Fund, ICAI, December 2014, http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ICAI-Report-International-Climate-Fund.pdf.

²⁸ Managing the Official Development Assistance target, NAO, January 2015, page 31, paragraph 1.47, http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Managing-the-official-development-assistance-target.pdf. ‘Options the Department were considering [at November 2014] included making new loans to the Private Infrastructure Development Group which invests in private sector companies.’

²⁹ Oversight of the Private Infrastructure Development Group, NAO, July 2014, http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Oversight-of-the-private-infrastructure-development-group.pdf; Oversight of the Private Infrastructure Development Group, House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Thirty-third Report of Session 2014-15, January 2015, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmpubacc/675/675.pdf.

³⁰ In 2013-14, £98 million of non-fiscal spending represented 1% of DFID’s £9.9 billion total programme expenditure (see DFID Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, page 10, paragraph 1.6, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/331591/annual-report-accounts-2013-14a.pdf). The £692 million floor target for non-fiscal spending in 2015-16 represents 6.2% of budgeted programme expenditure.

³¹ Managing the Official Development Assistance Target, NAO, January 2015, page 7, http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Managing-the-official-development-assistance-target.pdf.

³² See, for example, comments by Mark Lowcock at the IMF in 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/modernising-development-finance-the-future-of-official-development-assistance-oda.

³³ Trade for Investment and Growth, Department for Business, Skills and Innovation, February 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228941/8015.pdf.

³⁴ Working as one team at Post: Guidance for DFID, UKTI and FCO staff on HMG’s Commercial Diplomacy and Untied Aid Agenda, UK Government, April 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67541/gov-guidelines-commercial-diplomacy.pdf.

³⁵ [Missing footnote 35]

³⁶ See http://www.oecd.org/development/untyingaidtherighttochoose.htm.

³⁷ Working as one team at Post: Guidance for DFID, UKTI and FCO staff on HMG’s Commercial Diplomacy and Untied Aid Agenda, UK Government, April 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67541/gov-guidelines-commercial-diplomacy.pdf.

³⁸ The UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study on Sustainability 2013, Accenture and UN Global Compact, September 2013, http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-UN-Global-Compact-Acn-CEO-Study-Sustainability-2013.pdf.

³⁹ See, for example, the Global Compact Critics blog, hosted by the Centre for Research on Multinational Companies, at http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.co.uk/.

⁴⁰ DFID’s Private Sector Development Work, ICAI, May 2014, http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ICAI-PSD-report-FINAL.pdf.

⁴¹ [Note: Footnote 41 appears in Figure 8 text above]

⁴² A. Brain, N. Gulrajani and J. Mitchell, Meeting the Challenge: How can Enterprise Challenge Funds be Made to Work Better?, EPS PEAKS, 2014, http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/How%20can%20enterprise%20challenge%20funds%20be%20made%20to%20work%20better.pdf.

⁴³ Market failure occurs where businesses do not have the financial capacity to bring innovations to market and cannot access credit. Promoting innovation and evidence-based approaches to building resilience and responding to humanitarian crises: A DFID Strategy Paper, DFID, 2012, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/prom-innov-evi-bas-appr-build-res-resp-hum-cris.pdf.

⁴⁴ M. Porter and M. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, Harvard Business Review, January 2011, https://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-idea-creating-shared-value.

⁴⁵ This fund awarded grants to private sector and civil society organisations which committed to demonstrating sustainable improvement in the working conditions of enterprises supplying the UK clothing market.

⁴⁶ Capturing the Gains, Economic and Social Upgrading, Global Production Networks and Trade, DFID, October 2013, http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Project/60958/.

⁴⁷ Donor Partnerships with Business for Private Sector Development. What can we Learn from Experience?, March 2013, http://www.enterprise-development.org/page/download?id=2147.

⁴⁸ A. Estache and C. Philippe, The Impact of PPI on Poverty in Developing Countries, IFC Economics Note #3, IFC 2010.

⁴⁹ AHME Global Health Progress Report Form, June 2014.

⁵⁰ M. Winters and R. Soni, Strategic Review of the FRICH, November 2014.

⁵¹ Evaluation of the Responsible and Accountable Garment Sector Programme, Smith et al, Oxford Policy Management, April 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/328558/Responsible-Accountable-Garment-Sector-Programme.pdf.

⁵² C. Grace, and B. Caraso, CHAI Final Evaluation, 2011.

⁵³ DFID Annual Review of Market-Shaping for Access to Safe, Effective and Affordable Health Commodities, DFID, October 2014, http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/4407371.docx.

⁵⁴ Annual Report to BCtA Steering Committee: Inclusive Business Gains Momentum, Business Call to Action, 2013, http://www.businesscalltoaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/BCtA_AnnualReview2013_Web.pdf.

⁵⁵ See, for example, Evaluation of DANIDA’s Business-to-Business Programme 2006-2011, May 2014, http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/14_danida_btb_programme_2006_2011/Pdf/danida_btb_programme_2006_2011.pdf.

⁵⁶ Evaluation of the Responsible and Accountable Garment Sector Programme, Smith et al, Oxford Policy Management, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/328558/Responsible-Accountable-Garment-Sector-Programme.pdf.

⁵⁷ Policy on Subsidies to For-Profit Firms, DFID, December 2014.

⁵⁸ M. Winters and R. Soni, Strategic Review of the FRICH.

⁵⁹ Progress Report, 2013-14, New Alliance, August 2014, https://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/072814_NewAlliance_FinalC_508.pdf.

⁶⁰ DFID’s Private Sector Development Work, ICAI, May 2014, http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ICAI-PSD-report-FINAL.pdf.

⁶¹ Assessing the Impact of the Scale-Up of DFID’s Support to Fragile States, ICAI, February 2015, http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ICAI-Report-Assessing-the-Impact-of-the-Scale-up-of-DFID%E2%80%99s-Support-to-Fragile-States.pdf.

⁶² There are other business engagement hubs in DFID including one located in the Africa Regional Department and another in the Climate and Environment Department.

⁶³ How DFID Learns, ICAI, April 2014, http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/How-DFID-Learns-FINAL.pdf.

⁶⁴ M. Winters and R. Soni, Strategic Review of the FRICH; Smith et al. Evaluation of the Responsible and Accountable Garment Sector Programme.

⁶⁵ It is important to note that these criticisms are aimed at the New Alliance as a coordinating mechanism rather than at the individual DFID programmes which have been (re-)branded as New Alliance programmes. We have not reviewed individual programmes, which make up the vast majority of the UK’s ‘New Alliance’ expenditure.